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WITNESS STATEMENT OF DR MOUSA ABU MARZOUK

ON OPERATION TOOFAN AL-AQSA

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I, MOUSA ABU MARZOUK, resident in Doha, Qatar, and the Head of International Relations and Legal Office in the Political Bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement - ‘Hamas’, MAKE THIS STATEMENT in support of the application by the organisation for its deproscription.

1. On the morning of October 7th, 2023, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades executed a military manoeuvre targeting the Gaza Division of Israel’s Southern Command.

2. On January 21^st, 2024, we released an 18-page document entitled ‘Our Narrative – Operation al-Aqsa Flood’. This constituted the movement’s official narrative about the events of October 7^th, 2023. Despite the document being published in both Arabic and English and widely distributed, the mainstream Western media chose not to publish or discuss it and instead decided to continue to propagate Zionist lies and propaganda surrounding the operation as a means of enabling the continuing genocide of the Palestinian people.

3. What follows should be viewed as a commentary on that document which I will refer to as Hamas Narrative Document (‘HND’). Excerpts from that narrative will appear below as embedded paragraphs and can be distinguished by their appearing in bold and italics. I am conscious that the same anti-Palestinian racism that allowed many in the West to believe that our people would behead, burn and bake babies, glorify Hitler and Daesh simultaneously, and engage in mass and systematic rape, will prejudice your ability to accept the veracity of what I will say. We have therefore taken the time and effort to corroborate the account below with reports from the print and broadcast media. I trust that this will help you read this account without your judgment being clouded by any inherent anti-Palestinian racism.

WHY OPERATION TOOFAN AL-AQSA?

4. Section 1 of the HND refers to the reasons why the Toofan Al Aqsa operation happened at all. Gaza is a region where more than 70% of the residents are refugees from the 1948 Nakba – the Catastrophe. That Catastrophe, where 57% of the indigenous residents of Palestine were expelled and over 500 Palestinian villages destroyed, was soon followed by the Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine in 1967. Since 2007, siege conditions have been imposed on Gaza for seventeen gruelling years, where Palestinians have endured five destructive wars within a broader Israeli policy of ‘mowing the lawn.’ According to ‘official figures’ cited in section 1 of the HND, between January 2000 and September 2023, 11,299 Palestinians were killed, with a further 156,768 injured, at the hands of the Israeli occupation.¹

5. Our leaders have repeatedly referred to the causative factors that led to Toofan Al Aqsa. Our former leader, the martyr Ismail Haniyeh, who was martyred by the Zionist entity in Tehran on July 31^st, 2024, spoke at a conference in January 2024 in Doha and mentioned three primary factors. The first, was the general erasure of the Palestinian cause from the consideration of much of the world. The second, was the unique extremism of the current Zionist government that has created a permissive environment for settler attacks in the West Bank, openly celebrated the torture of Palestinians in Israeli prisons, agitated for the destruction of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and hosted ministers who have publicly flirted with expulsion plans and the erasure of Palestine from the map of the Middle East. The third factor he mentioned was the normalisation trajectory initiated by the Abraham Accords. Normalisation provided additional legitimacy to the Zionist entity, and in so doing, also meant the effective normalisation of Palestinian suffering.²

6. It is important to understand that the October 7^th offensive was a pre-emptive one, executed once we had acquired intelligence that Israeli forces were planning to attack Palestinian resistance groups. As early as October 12^th, the martyr Saleh al-Arouri, the ex-deputy head of Hamas who was martyred by the Zionist entity in Beirut on January 2^nd, 2024, mentioned this when he said, “we carried out a pre-emptive strike. We had information that there were arrangements to come after the holidays for a surprise attack against us. And for that reason, we carried out this pre-emptive attack on the Gaza Division.”³ Likewise, Abu Ubaidah, military spokesperson for the Qassam brigades, has referred to operation Toofan Al-Aqsa, as one which “shook the Zionist enemy and changed the face of the region… [it was an operation] in which we struck the enemy with a massive pre-emptive strike after its planning for a major strike against the resistance in Gaza, with all its resistance factions, had reached its final stages.”⁴ A Channel 12 investigation also revealed that on October 1^st, 2023, the head of Shin Bet presented a plan for a “broad campaign” against Hamas in which Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar and Muhammad al-Deif, should be assassinated.⁵

7. The Israeli violations and brutality were documented by many UN organizations international human rights groups including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and even documented by Israeli human rights groups. However, these reports and testimonies were ignored and the Israeli occupation is yet to be held accountable. For example, on Oct 29, 2021, Israel’s Ambassador the UN Gilad Erdan insulted the UN system by tearing up a report for the UN Human Rights Council during an address at the General Assembly and threw it in a dustbin before leaving the podium. Yet, he was appointed in the following year – 2022 – to the post of vice-president of the UN General Assembly.

8. The US administration and its western allies have always been treating Israel as a state above the law; they provide it with the needed cover to maintain prolonging the occupation and cracking down the Palestinian people and also allowing 'Israel' to exploit such situation to expropriate further Palestinian lands and to Judaize their sanctities and holy sites. Despite the fact that the UN had issued more than 900 resolutions over the past 75 years in favor of the Palestinian people, 'Israel' rejected to abide by any of these resolutions, and the US VETO was always present at the UN Security Council to prevent any condemnation to 'Israel's' policies and violations. That’s why we see the US and other western countries complicit and partners to the Israeli occupation in its crimes and in the continued suffering of the Palestinian people.

9. As for “the peaceful settlement process” … the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stipulated the establishment of a Palestinian independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip… 'Israel' systematically destroyed every possibility to establish the Palestinian state through a wide campaign of settlements’ construction and Judaization of the Palestinian lands in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. The backers of the peace process after 30 years realized that they have reached an impasse and that such process had catastrophic results on the Palestinian people.⁶

10. In 1988, as chairman of the PLO, Yasir Arafat broke with the philosophy of armed resistance initially articulated by Fatah as the “sole, inevitable, unavoidable, and indispensable means in the battle of liberation.”⁷ That break coincided with the expression of willingness to concede 78% of the land which had been lost in 1948 and accept a state comprised of Gaza and the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital. By the time the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, Arafat’s 1988 condemnation of terrorism had become a complete renunciation of violence, with Arafat writing to Yitzhak Rabin that the signing of the Accords would inaugurate “a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability.”⁸ The Accords meant the unilateral recognition of ‘Israel’ without iron-clad commitments to Palestinian statehood, and that the Palestinian Authority would enforce security for the Zionist entity. Thirty years later, approximately 40% of the entire West Bank is under the direct control of Zionist settlements according to B’Tselem⁹, and more than 4,000 hectares of land have been designated Israeli state land.¹⁰ Hamas’ refusal to participate in this Oslo process – this ’peaceful settlement process‘ – has constantly been invoked in order not to recognise the movement.

11. The people in Gaza in 2018 also initiated the Great March of Return demonstrations to peacefully protest the Israeli blockade, their misery humanitarian conditions and to demand their right-to-return. However, the Israeli occupation forces responded to these protests with brutal force by which 360 Palestinians were killed, and 19,000 others were injured including over 5,000 children in a matter of months.¹¹

12. On numerous occasions we attempted to pursue the path of non-violent resistance, but this only served as a means of entrenching the occupation and perpetuating the Israeli violence against our people. Following the ‘Sword of Jerusalem’ battle in 2021 battle, the martyr Yahya Sinwar gave an interview to Hind Hassan of Vice News, in which he discussed these efforts. “We know that we don’t want war or fighting because it costs lives, and our people deserve peace. For long periods of time, we’ve tried peaceful resistance. We expected that the international community, free people and international organizations, would stop the occupation from committing crimes and massacring our people. Unfortunately, the world stood by and watched as the occupation war machine killed our young people.” Yahya Sinwar was then asked about alleged war crimes committed by Hamas through the indiscriminate firing of its rockets into Israel. He responded, “Israel- which possesses a complete arsenal of weaponry, state-of-the-art equipment and aircrafts – intentionally bombs and kills our children and women. And they do that on purpose. You can’t compare that to those who resist and defend themselves with weapons that look primitive in comparison. If we had the capabilities to launch precision missiles that targeted military targets, we wouldn’t have used the rockets that we did. We are forced to defend our people with what we have and this is what we have. What are we supposed to do? Should we raise the white flag? That’s not going to happen. Does the world expect us to be well-behaved victims while we’re getting killed? For us to be slaughtered without making a noise? That’s impossible. We decided to defend our people with whatever weapons we have.”¹²

13. The Israeli officials confirmed at several occasions their absolute rejection to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Just one month before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a map of a so-called “New Middle East,” depicting 'Israel' stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea including the West Bank and Gaza¹³. The entire world at that – UN General Assembly’s – podium were silent towards his speech full of arrogance and ignorance towards the rights of the Palestinian people.¹⁴

14. Toofan Al-Aqsa must be understood as being carried out within a prolonged context, where an untenable situation was expected to indefinitely perdure: two million lives within Gaza, with little prospects or hope; the relentless air, sea and land blockade on the Gaza strip; the advent of an extreme Zionist government openly flirting with expulsion plans; increased incursions on the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque; thousands of Palestinians held without charge in Israeli prisons under administrative attention; settler attacks, the increasing growth of settlements, and the destruction of Palestinian property in the Occupied West Bank; and all without any means – with all means having been tried and tested – to resolve the situation peacefully. At the UN, there is the American veto. Inside of occupied Palestine, there are military courts and administrative detention. Palestinians who protest are kneecapped and killed by Zionist snipers.

15. Proceeding from the above, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Oct. 7 was a necessary step and a normal response to confront all Israeli conspiracies against the Palestinian people and their cause. It was a defensive act in the frame of getting rid of the Israeli occupation, reclaiming the Palestinians rights and on the way for liberation and independence like all peoples around the world did.¹⁵

16. Speaking in December 2023 and reflecting on the decision to engage in armed resistance against the Zionist occupation, military spokesperson for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Abu Ubaidah had the following to say, placing our struggle against Zionist occupation within a series of anti-occupation struggles within recent history: “We never for a single day desired war and destruction. It would have been better that the Zionists of the West and the East acknowledge the rights of our people and end the occupation. But they preferred [instead] to buy time for the interests of the criminal occupation, so that they [the Israelis] could obliterate our people, and erase our cause. But, as a people possessing truth, a cause and a message, and as a faithful resistance responsible for acquiring our rights, we persisted in preparing and fighting, because rights are not taken back except by force, and because all the peoples of the earth who have been occupied gained their freedom through blood, severed body parts and fighting. And there is in Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Africa, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon and many other countries ample proof of that.”¹⁶ There is no distinction between our struggle and those struggles which were opposed by the West at the time but whose legitimacy was confirmed by history.

17. After 75 years of relentless occupation and suffering, and after failing all initiatives for liberation and return to our people, and also after the disastrous results of the so-called peace process, what did the world expect from the Palestinian people to do…

18. What was expected from the Palestinian people after all of that? To keep waiting and to keep counting on the helpless UN! Or to take the initiative in defending the Palestinian people, lands, rights and sanctities; knowing that the defense act is a right enshrined in international laws, norms and conventions.¹⁷

19. At 07:47 on 7 October 2023, the Commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades Abu Khaled Muhammad al-Deif, announced the beginning of operation Toofan Al-Aqsa: “In light of these ongoing crimes, and in light of the rampages of the occupation and its disregard of international laws and resolutions, and in light of the American and Western support [for the Zionist entity], and the global silence [as relates to our cause], we have decided to put a stop to all of this with the aid of Allah, so that the enemy may understand that the time where they could run riot without any consequence has come to an end. We announce the beginning of operation Toofan Al-Aqsa.”¹⁸

TOWARDS A TRANSPARENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION

20. Palestine is a member-state of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and it acceded to its Rome Statute in 2015. When Palestine asked for investigation into Israeli war crimes committed on its territories, it was faced by Israeli intransigence and rejection, and threats to punish the Palestinians for the request to ICC. It is also unfortunate to mention that there were great powers, which claim to be holding values of justice, completely sided with the occupation narrative and stood against the Palestinian moves in the international justice system. These powers want to keep 'Israel' as a state above the law and to ensure it escapes liability and accountability.

21. We urge these countries, especially the US administration, Germany, Canada and the UK, if they are meant for justice to prevail as they claim, they are ought to announce their support to the course of the investigation in all crimes committed in occupied Palestine to give full support for the international courts to effectively do their job.

22. Despite having doubts from these countries to stand by justice, we still urge the ICC Prosecutor and his team to immediately and urgently come to occupied Palestine to look into the crimes and violations committed there, rather than merely observing the situation remotely or being subject to the Israeli restrictions¹⁹

23. Perhaps the most extensive study yet published on the events of October 7^th, 2023, was carried out by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and ‘Israel’.²⁰ It therefore serves to remark briefly on some aspects of that report, as is relevant to any discussions about the events of the day.

24. From the limitations mentioned by the Commission of their investigation, was the persistent refusal of Israeli officials to cooperate. The Commission notes that they sent four requests for information to 'Israel' as well as six requests for access to 'Israel' and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, all of which received no response. Investigators were forced then, to work remotely, unable to visit sites where attacks were recorded to have taken place.²¹ Furthermore, the Israeli Ministry of Justice actively barred medical professionals who had treated the survivors of the October 7^th operation from speaking to the Commission’s investigators. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lior Haiat called the Commission “an anti-Israeli and antisemitic body” and called those chosen to head it – Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), Miloon Kothari (India) and Chris Sidoti (Australia) – “famous antisemitic and anti-Israeli people”.²²

25. Similar closed-door policies are in place as pertains to press access to the Gaza Strip. The Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, an independent Israeli organisation which represents members of the international media²³, brought a petition to 'Israel's' Supreme Court to allow independent access for journalists to report from Gaza, which the Court rejected in January 2024.²⁴ A July 2024 open letter signed by more than 70 media and civil society organisations including the Associated Press, the BBC, CNN, The New York Times and the Washington Post called for 'Israel' to allow journalists independent access to Gaza.²⁵ This is whilst within Gaza, as of November 8^th 2024, at least 137 journalists and media workers have been killed.²⁶ Though reporting from Gaza since October 7^th may not necessarily concern investigating the events of October 7^th, these facts speak to a consistent attitude of non-compliance when it comes to independent investigations and verification of facts – a reality that at least provides motive for pause. As a Haaretz editorial had it recently: “Why Is Israel Afraid to Allow Foreign Journalists in Gaza? What’s It Hiding?”²⁷

26. Whilst Israeli authorities have obstructed independent investigatory access to sites where attacks are alleged to have taken place on October 7^th, it has at the same time facilitated highly publicised visits for celebrities and social personalities to those same locations. Music executive Scooter Braun visited Kibbutz Be’eri in late December,²⁸ singer Montana Tucker visited Kfar Aza at around the same time²⁹, and actress Debra Messing visited Southern 'Israel' and even entered Gaza where she was interviewed by Douglas Murray³⁰. All these trips were, according to the Jewish Chronicle, ‘part of a broad effort to bring people with major audiences to Israel.’³¹ American entrepreneur Elon Musk also visited Kfar Aza with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu where he was shown, amongst other things, a baby’s cot filled with spent bullets.³² An investigation by a Turkish disinformation centre has suggested that these bullets were planted, belonging to a weapon not possessed by the Palestinian resistance.³³

27. In similar vein, the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) have held private screenings at various locations across the world. Prepared for limited foreign and domestic audiences, – particularly politicians, diplomats and journalists – the 43-minute film gathers footage of alleged atrocities committed on October 7^th. The private screenings, as CBC’s Evan Dyer has it, are “part of Israel’s effort to convince outsiders that its war in Gaza is justified.”³⁴ Like the celebrities who visited 'Israel', attendees were expected to ”bear witness”, but also, as journalist Owen Jones put it, “make the PR case for Israel’s onslaught against Gaza.”³⁵ According to Dyer, the privately screened footage has not been widely disseminated because either ”victims’ family members [had] not agreed to it, or because of Jewish traditions about respect for the dead.” That notwithstanding, where access was denied for the UN Commission’s investigators, it was provided for celebrities, journalists and politicians where there were political and narrative gains to be made for the Zionist entity.

28. Without direct independent access to investigate what took place, a type of monopoly exists in the hands of the Zionist entity in relation to which information becomes publicly accessible, and thereafter available to be examined by third parties. The Commission expressed a general concern about a lack of forensic evidence collection at the Shura camp where bodies were brought for identification. It refers to, but does not reference, a report in an Israeli news publication which details that there was only one CT scanner in the Shura camp, an ‘integral’ piece of medical equipment for determining the cause of death.³⁶ It mentions as well that religious volunteer groups like Unit 360 and ZAKA were deployed as first responders on the day – ”units who were not trained or equipped to manage large, complex crime scenes and may have also tainted, or even tampered with, evidence.”³⁷ And, as the Commission alludes to, ZAKA regional head Yossi Landau, with the privileged access he was provided to attack locations, proceeded to feed highly exaggerated and fabricated accounts to the media of a foetus cut from its mother’s stomach, and “two piles of ten children each…tied to the back, burned to death.”³⁸ In a climate where independent verification of information was persistently obstructed, tales not too dissimilar were repeated in the UK and in the White House, and carried by numerous media organisations across the world.

29. In substantiating their findings, the UN Commission report makes copious reference to video evidence seen by investigators. This includes – but is not limited to – CCTV footage, dashcam footage, social media posts, and GoPro footage taken from the bodies of dead Palestinian fighters. This footage is not referenced. We believe that the UN Commission, similar to Al-Jazeera’s Investigations Unit which contributed to the network’s October 7^th documentary, relied heavily on footage obtained from the ‘South First Responders’ Telegram Channel.

30. What has been mentioned above concerning the monopoly over the source material which exists becomes particularly relevant as relates to third party efforts to reconstruct/understand the events of the day. One can easily imagine that there is, from all the Go Pros found on the bodies of dead fighters, all the CCTV cameras in Southern Occupied Palestine, and all dashcams which might have captured scenes, thousands of hours of footage. The public has access to but a few hours of footage – Al-Jazeera’s Investigations Unit having viewed only about seven hours of it³⁹. The most heavily relied on source of that limited material is the South First Responders channel, which belongs to an Israeli emergency response group that explicitly states that its intention was to upload content from the day which shows that the intention of Hamas fighters was to massacre innocent civilians, and not, as Hamas have claimed, to attack military targets.

31. In the context of the refusal to comply with any international investigations, to allow for independent journalistic assessments, to allow access to alleged attack sites, or to be truly transparent with primary source data, it should be recognised that researchers are necessarily making conclusions about October 7^th based only on what non-compliant and biased Israeli authorities have released to the public. In other words, precisely because independent and transparent enquiries have been obstructed at every turn, most of what can be used publicly to unpack the events of October 7^th is content which has been specifically selected to perform a narrative function in favour of the Israelis.

32. We are confident that any fair and independent inquiries will prove the truth of our narrative and will prove the scale of lies and misleading information in the Israeli side.⁴⁰

33. I reiterate the Hamas position that we remain prepared and willing to carry out its own internal investigation into any alleged crimes committed by any of its members and hold them to account if the allegations are proven against them. It is impossible however to have such accountability measures in place while we are defending our people against genocide. Hamas also remains prepared, as it always has been, to fully cooperate with the ICC and any other independent inquiry, even if the Zionist entity refuses to do so.

THE EVENTS OF OPERATION TOOFAN AL-AQSA AND RESPONSES TO THE ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS

34. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Oct. 7 targeted the Israeli military sites and sought to arrest the enemy’s soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails through a prisoner exchange deal. Therefore, the operation focused on destroying the Israeli army’s Gaza Division, the Israeli military sites stationed near the Israeli settlements around Gaza.⁴¹

35. As our leaders have stated publicly, and I reiterate now, Toofan Al-Aqsa was first and foremost an Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades operation. For example, the martyr Saleh Al-Arouri said, “As for the attack that took place on Saturday morning, it was an organised, regimental operation.” The purpose of the operation was to target the military positions of the Gaza Division – that component of the Israeli Southern Command concerned with maintaining the siege on the Gaza Strip. Fighters were to overrun these locations and attempt to take military prisoners who could later be exchanged for the thousands of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons. As the day progressed, and it became known within Gaza not just that an attack was taking place, but also that the Israeli army in the surrounding areas of the Gaza strip had been annihilated, other armed factions and civilians began to emerge from Gaza. A situation of general chaos ensued – unplanned for – where many civilians were killed. The following paragraphs will expand on the basic components of this narrative.

36. That the operation was launched and led by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is hardly controversial. Though there has been a joint operations room bringing together Qassam and other Palestinian resistance factions active in its current form since 2018⁴², that has not meant all military operations from Gaza require complete cooperation from all factions. For instance, in mid-2022, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) responded to Israeli bombing in Gaza which killed at least 49 Palestinians by firing rockets at 'Israel', whereas Hamas remained out of the fighting.⁴³ As relates to October 7^th then, PIJ deputy general secretary Dr Muhammad Al-Hindi has stated clearly that the PIJ were surprised by the attack, but made the earnest decision to participate as soon as it had begun. “On the 6^th of October, our guys were celebrating – celebrating [the anniversary of] our founding. Effectively the whole movement was… walking in the streets… marching… until the early hours of the morning. And after a few hours, they were surprised, as the whole world was surprised with Toofan Al-Aqsa. They had no choice, given that the Islamic Jihad Movement is a resistance movement, except to participate in the defense of the Palestinian people… The whole movement – its leaders and members – was surprised, and did not expect [the attack to happen].”⁴⁴

37. Not only was it – and for clarification’s purposes, what is meant here is the strategized and planned for operation – a Hamas operation, but those called to take part in the operation were specifically Qassam’s elite forces: Al-Nukhba.⁴⁵ When observing the footage from the day, one thing to look for is anything that took place on the day, from whomever came out of Gaza. It has largely been assumed that all video footage has been of Qassam members, and conclusions about the October 7^th operation have been made with this assumption. Another image entirely emerges if an attempt is made to consider specifically what the Qassam-planned operation was, and to see whether evidence that substantiates it could be found, even from the limited and intentionally selected source data that is publicly accessible. That operation is what would be expected to be determined by the orders of central command and which required extensive planning. This was executed but followed by a state of general chaos as others – resistance groups as well as armed and unarmed civilians – began to cross the occupation fence into Southern Occupied Palestine. Taking this into account, which has hardly been done in the English language, changes completely how one receives much of the October 7^th footage, as will be shown further below. It cannot be understated how crucial this is. Finally, as some have suggested, that it was an elite forces operation means it remains conceivable that individuals bearing Hamas apparel (but not from the elite forces assigned to the operation, or indeed, not at all officially Qassam members) emerged from the Gaza Strip and carried out actions that were not determined by the explicit strategy outlined by Qassam leadership.

38. Though public training drills have been taking place for some time⁴⁶, the actual details of the October 7^th offensive were kept secret from most Qassam members until the morning of the operation. The Qassam Brigades operate completely independently of the Political Bureau and make their own decisions on all aspects of military operations, including the timing and the nature of any such operations. This was also recently explained at a conference in Nouakchott, Mauritania, by Hamas political leader Osama Hamdan when he revealed details concerning the unveiling of the operation. “When the commanders decided to carry out this operation, they kept the matter secret from their soldiers and only told them about it a few hours beforehand. There were about 1,400 Mujahidin called forward who were expected to cross the separation fence, and they were given the choice to go ahead, or be granted an excuse [to sit out] for whomever had an excuse. The leadership surprised them with this decision and called them forth suddenly. Every human being has things which keep them busy in this world. These [fighters] were given a choice, [yet]1,400, and not even one of them stayed back. For that reason, our enemy must know who they are fighting. They are fighting a people who do not see victory except with Allah, nor do they put they trust in anything but Allah’s might and power.”⁴⁷

39. What were the instructions given that morning? As we stated in the HND, the attack was designed to specifically target the Gaza Division of 'Israel's' Southern Command. Saleh al-Arouri speaking to Al Jazeera on October 12^th, 2023 had the following to say: “The instructions for it [the operation] from the commanders of Qassam to the brothers that took part in the offensive operation on the Gaza Division… the Gaza Division, this military division which is present in the Gaza envelope, and which is responsible for all the crimes against our people in Gaza. It is responsible for the siege on Gaza, the bombing of Gaza, assassinations and incursions.”⁴⁸ On the following day, in a pre-recorded English press conference published on our Telegram channel, senior Hamas leaders Dr Basim Naim and Ghazi Hamad similarly said that “the operation targeted only military bases and compounds that were suffocating the people of Gaza for more than seventeen years.”⁴⁹

40. The 143^rd Fire Fox Division, known to most as the Gaza Division, is a division of the Israeli army subordinated to its Southern Command. It was set up in 1987 following the beginning of the First Intifada and was tasked with controlling key Gazan cities such as Rafah and Khan Yunis. In 1994, the Division relocated within Israeli settlements in Gaza. Then, in 2005, following the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Division settled in several bases around the borders of Gaza.⁵⁰ The Gaza Division is then, that part of the Israeli army which is responsible for all the ‘operations’ carried out by the IOF in Gaza: the ‘mowing the lawn’ operations, the siege conditions, the bombings and the assassinations. It is one of the most, if not the most, detested unit of the IOF by the Palestinian people As has been noted by some, much of the euphoria many Palestinians feel when they remember the October 7^th operation has to do precisely with the victory achieved over this division of the Israeli army which has been responsible for so much of their suffering. As journalist Muhammad Shehada has said: “In that sense, two 7 Octobers have since emerged; one that Israel and its supporters see as “pure evil”, which focuses on the killing and kidnapping of civilians, and another that Palestinians voice support for; an attack on military targets that broke Israel’s image of invincibility.”⁵¹ On October 7^th, its bases were overrun, and high-ranking soldiers like the Commander of the Division’s Southern Brigade, Col. Asaf Hamimi were captured.⁵² By attacking the Gaza Division, Qassam fighters were to capture military prisoners from that division to be used in future negotiations to free the thousands of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons. And this is, broadly speaking, precisely what the martyr Al-Arouri says took place: “It was not from the plan of Qassam even [to capture civilian] prisoners… Qassam military youth took army [personnel] as prisoners and returned to Gaza.”

41. This brings to light the centrality of the plight of Palestinian prisoners to the planning of the October 7^th operation. The martyr Yahya Sinwar, who was himself freed from captivity in 2011 following a trade deal for Zionist soldier Gilad Shalit, in an interview given to Francesca Borri in 2018, described the case of Palestinian prisoners as not “just a political issue… [but] a moral issue.” He continued: “…your readers probably believe that if you are in jail, you are a terrorist, or somehow an outlaw. A car thief. No. We all get arrested, sooner or later. But literally – all of us. Take a look at Military Order 101. Without authorization, it’s a crime even to wave a flag, or be more than ten (people) in a room for tea, chatting about politics. Perhaps you are just chatting about Trump, but you can be sentenced up to 10 years. Somehow, it’s a rite of passage. It’s our coming of age. Because if there is something we are united by, something that makes us all equal – all Palestinians – it’s prison. And for me it is a moral obligation: I will try more than my best to free those who are still inside.”⁵³

42. In that interview, Borri responded by saying that “[i]n some way, you achieved more through kidnappings than through rockets… like Gilad Shalit’s.” Sinwar replied: “Gilad Shalit wasn’t a hostage; he was a war prisoner. You see why we rarely speak with journalists? A soldier gets killed, and you publish a photo of him on the beach, and your readers think we shot him in Tel Aviv. No. That guy wasn’t killed while wearing Bermuda shorts and carrying a surfboard, but while wearing uniform and carrying an M16, and firing on us.” Though speaking in 2018, these quotes ought to be noted for the impact that they have in unpacking the thinking behind our October 7^th operation. Faced with an unsustainable situation of thousands of Palestinians in Israeli prisons, and no means – as our leaders have pointed out before and after Toofan Al-Aqsa – of freeing them, an offensive was launched with the intention of capturing soldiers from the Israeli Gaza Division that could be used to secure an exchange. Such an exchange, as negotiations since Oct 7^th, 2023, have demonstrated, prioritises the thousands of women and children being kept in Israeli prisons, many under administrative detention. There are realms of evidence produced by the UN and Palestinian, international, and even Israeli NGOs, about the torture and abuse, physical and sexual, of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Children and women are not spared. The Palestinian people celebrated the release of our hostages during the one-week ceasefire in November 2023. It is reflective of the deep anti-Palestinian racism and hatred within Western governments that they did not share our happiness to see hundreds of our women and children freed from the Zionist prisons.

43. What might be said about the taking of civilian prisoners? As indicated above, many other resistance factions aside from the Qassam Brigades, as well as armed and unarmed civilians, crossed the occupation fence into Southern Occupied Palestine. The situation is complicated from an investigatory perspective by the fact that Qassam and non-Qassam elements were active during some of the same time periods. As official military pronouncements make clear, Qassam squads operated outside of Gaza from 06.30 on October 7^th into subsequent days. The spokespeople for both the Mujahideen Brigades and the al-Aqsa Martys’ Brigades announced early on Saturday morning that their members were participating on the ground – at 08:19 and 08:30 respectively.⁵⁴ What this led to was a situation where, as is shown in much of the video evidence from the day, members of different factions, or indeed Gazan civilians and resistance members, often appearing together at the same time and in the same locations. Appreciating this is crucial.

44. Though the martyr Saleh Al-Arouri was adamant that the plan of Qassam was to take military prisoners, he did not deny that civilians were captured on the day. “There were civilians captured – general people entered, took people and brought them back to Gaza. That was not the intention of Hamas…”⁵⁵ In another interview from December 2^nd 2023, Al-Arouri clarified that “the female and child prisoners were not targeted as an objective, but arrived in Gaza in exceptional circumstances.”⁵⁶Some of the most widely circulated images from October 7^th of Israelis being captured, did not, as is apparent from video footage, take place at the hands of Qassam soldiers – like that of Noa Argamani.⁵⁷ In cell phone footage recorded and shared online, what appears to be a group of foreign workers are being driven in the back of a truck towards the Gaza Strip. In this clip, the cameraman identifies himself as belonging to the Ansar Brigades – a Fatah affiliated armed group in Gaza. Like Noa, Amit Soussana, who was filmed in a widely circulated clip resisting capture, was quite clearly not captured by Qassam squads. This is particularly so in the case of many children and elderly taken. A notable case is that of Avital Aldajem from Kibbutz Holit who was shown in a clip broadcast on Al-Jazeera being released by Qassam members along with two children.⁵⁸ The broadcaster mentions, as the clip is shown, that they were apprehended during clashes, and then let go. In a Hebrew interview, Avital recalls being given “clothes to cover myself, out of respect.”⁵⁹

45. In the immediate aftermath of Toofan Al Aqsa, when it became evident that a number of prisoners had been taken by other groups and ordinary people, we made rigorous attempts to locate all of the prisoners. In the very first week, Qassam offered to unilaterally release all civilian prisoners. Unfortunately, due to the ceaseless Israeli bombing campaign, our attempts to locate the prisoners in that period was severely hampered. It is for this reason that in those early days, the Qassam military pronouncements were unable to confirm the exact number of those brought back into Gaza. As the Qassam forces began to locate and accounted for the hostages, despite the severity of the Israeli aerial bombardment, they offered to release elderly hostages like Yocheved Lifshitz unconditionally, yet Israel refused.⁶⁰ During the one-week November ceasefire, women, children and elderly being held in Gaza were exchanged for Palestinian women and children held in Israeli prisons – an arrangement that is only fair. As relates to those who remain, Al-Arouri explained: “…Those women and children that we had we have already exchanged, and if there are some [outlying] cases, we don’t know about them and have not been able to reach them. Those who remain as prisoners in Gaza are soldiers, and they are also civilian men who served in the occupation army.”⁶¹ He insisted at that time - and rightly so - that there will be no exchange of this group of prisoners until there is an end to the Zionist assault on Gaza.

46. Until now, the most detailed exposition from within our movement as to the details of the October 7^th offensive comes from a video message recorded by Qassam military spokesperson Abu Ubaidah.⁶² In that message from the 12^th of October, he describes in depth the various tactics and strategies that were employed in preparation for, and in execution of, the Toofan Al-Aqsa operation, in addition to mentioning many sites that were attacked. For two years since the 2021 ‘Sword of Jerusalem’ battle, he explains how the impression was purposefully given that the Qassam Brigades were no longer interested in any military confrontation with the Israelis. Doing so was difficult: the movement took the decision not to engage alongside the PIJ in 2022, ignored several violations in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa, and also concluded a deal to halt border protests just a week beforehand.⁶³ Just six days before the launching of Toofan Al-Aqsa, Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi said in a radio interview that “Hamas is very, very restrained and understands the implications of further defiance.” According to the New York Times, an Israeli intelligence briefing from the week before the attack about the most urgent threats to the country’s defences ‘barely mentioned’ Hamas, who were deemed to be ‘deterred.’⁶⁴ That same article makes mention of alleged calls monitored by Israeli intelligence agents of Hamas operatives which gave the impression that they sought to avoid another war with Israel so soon after the damaging 2021 conflagration. Abu Ubaidah remarked, that “the enemy’s inability to read the resistance’s intentions is one of the most significant signs of its failure.”⁶⁵

47. Any cross-border operation necessarily required breaching the separation wall that had been erected around the Gaza Strip. In December 2021, the Israelis completed a new 65km long barrier to the wall stretching the length of the 'Israel'- Gaza border after three and a half years of work. Costing $1.1 billion to build, the barrier included a sensor equipped underground wall, a six-meter high above ground fence, barriers at sea with monitoring equipment to detect incursions from water, remote controlled weapons systems and an array of cameras that cover the entire territory of the Gaza. Israeli officials had boasted proudly about the additions. Brig. Gen. Eran Ofir, the head of the border barrier project in the Defense Ministry, called it “one of the most complex projects the defense establishment has ever built.”⁶⁶ Netanyahu even posted on Twitter about the moment, calling the day the underground wall was completed “historic.”⁶⁷

48. The wall alongside the passive posture adopted by Hamas publicly created a sense of security for Israeli security officials. Residents of Southern Occupied Palestine like journalist Amir Tibon report that combat forces of about 20 people stationed at each community began to be redeployed to protect settlement projects in the West Bank after the completion of the underground wall.⁶⁸ Just two days before the attack, two commando companies – more than 100 soldiers – were reportedly moved to the West Bank, reflecting the belief that Hamas were not a threat.⁶⁹ A tweet later deleted from Netanyahu’s account stated that “the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seeking an arrangement.”⁷⁰ The deception held until the morning of October the 7th. As Gen Ziv, former head of the IOF's Operations Division has stated, despite reported intelligence to the contrary,⁷¹ the impression was that “Hamas wouldn’t attack, wouldn’t dare, and that even if so, they are not capable. We went to sleep on the 6^th thinking there’s a cat over there and we woke up on the 7^th and there’s a tiger.”⁷²

49. In breaching the wall, Abu Ubaidah spoke about what he referred to as a ‘Blackout Plan’, which would allow Qassam’s ground forces to operate beyond detection from 'Israel's' surveillance systems. That plan required immense study of the field and Israeli defence architecture. Reference is made in the speech to the use of cyber-attacks, as well as air cover provided by the firing of rockets. According to news reports, the Israeli border surveillance system was almost entirely reliant on cameras, sensors and remotely operated machine guns. Qassam operatives used aerial drones to attack cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system – scenes recorded by cameras mounted on Qassam drones and later shared online. Under the cover of iron dome explosions, Qassam snipers shot out cameras along the border, whilst more than 100 remotely operated drones took out watchtowers. As a result, Israeli soldiers stationed in control rooms did not receive alarms that the separation wall had been breached and could not watch video showing what was happening on the ground. In addition, leaders of the Gaza Division were clustered together in a singular location at its HQ (Re’im military base). Once that was overrun, and most of the Division’s senior officers were either killed, injured or taken prisoner, there was an almost complete breakdown in communications and chain of command. Few grasped the full breadth of what was happening until hours later. Only at 08.06 did the IOF report a “combined attack”, and it took until 08.25 for a “state of alert for war” to be declared.⁷³ With relatively elementary techniques and weaponry, Qassam had succeeded at effectively blinding 'Israel's' Gaza Division. They timed their attack to a morning where according to some reports, because of the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, about 1,500 soldiers in the area were away⁷⁴. Eyal Hulata, Israeli’s national security adviser from 2021-23, provided a damning assessment: “They were able to trick our collection, our analysis, our conclusions and our strategic understanding.”⁷⁵ In a video taken from a Qassam GoPro, a fighter shouts enthusiastically as his squad travels in a Toyota truck through Southern Occupied Palestine after breaking through the wall: “It will take them an hour to figure out what is going on!... They need twenty million years to realize what has happened!”⁷⁶

50. According to that same military pronouncement from the 12^th of October, the Toofan Al-Aqsa operation attacked all fifteen military sites of the Gaza Division. The Gaza Division is comprised of two territorial brigades, each comprising of seven sites which were all targeted. As listed by Abu Ubaidah, the 7643^rd Northern Brigade (Gefen) is comprised of the Yiftah Brigades base and its affiliated sites: the Coastal, Erez and Sixteen sites. There is also the Nahal Oz Brigades base and its affiliated sites: Paga and Alumim. The 6643^rd Southern Brigade (Katif) is comprised of the Kisufim Brigades base and its affiliated sites: Maris and Mivtachim. There is also the Amitai Brigades base with its affiliated sites: Kerem Shalom, Sufa and Netzarim. These are all in addition to Re’im military base which is the HQ for the Gaza Division. Mention is also made of attacks on targets beyond the Gaza Division in Southern Occupied Palestine, which included Mishmar HaNegev logistical support base, Urim SIGNIT base which houses the intelligence unit 8200, Yad Mordechai base, and Tze’elim base which is the HQ of the Sinai reserve division.⁷⁷ Again, much of this has been verified by Western media. Documents allegedly recovered by the IOF in Gaza, and reviewed by the New York Times, record that plans for the October 7^th offensive included ‘striking 46 positions staffed by the Israeli military division that guards the border…’⁷⁸ The following sections of this report will seek to sketch the nature of the offensives in some of these locations. It is reiterated, that a fully extensive and thorough assessment of what took place at all these locations will require precisely the type of transparent and independent investigation that has until this moment been obstructed. What can be discerned however, even at a distance, are the contours of a military operation intended to attack and overrun military targets.

51. Re’im base was the regional command-and-control centre and functioned as the HQ for the Southern Command’s Gaza Division. According to some reports, drone and surveillance operators were concentrated in this location. Once it was attacked, as Israeli tech journalist Assaf Gilead has said, everyone who should have been calling in drones was dead.⁷⁹ The dismantling was quite comprehensive. As Lt. Col. Alon Eviatar has remarked, there was a “complete destruction” of “communications systems, their antennas, even the systems that activated the sensors on the fence itself.” The attack is a notable one for multiple reasons. Firstly, that Qassam fighters were able to overcome the regional command-and-control centre with quite simple weaponry is worth taking note of – particularly as it came up against highly appraised and expensive Israeli security technology. As Audrey Kurth Cronin, director of the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Security and Technology has said: “Israeli tech is extremely admired around the world… This is an old-fashioned attack with hang gliders, motorbikes, bulldozers, explosives… Hamas has been quite creative and innovative.” Secondly, Qassam’s military media released videos taken by their fighters who participated in the attack⁸⁰. That footage shows a force riding along a road and passing a Hebrew road sign which points towards the base. The clip shows gun battles that take place, followed by still shots of dead Israeli soldiers. Quite crucially, the clip finishes with scenes of a large group of Qassam fighters walking back in the direction of Gaza. During this shot, the fighter bearing the camera says the following: “Now, our forces are walking back from Re’im to the Gaza Strip. These are our soldiers who inflicted heavy losses on our enemy. They killed who they killed and took as booty what they took.” It is an emphatic moment, which speaks to the nature of the task they were given, and the highly disciplined and clinical way that task was carried out. Thirdly, many high-ranking Israeli military personnel were killed at this location. They include (and are not limited to) Col Roi Levy (head of the IDF Multidomain Unit, also known as the “Ghost Unit”) and Lit. Col. Sahar Zion Makhlouf (commander of Israel’s 481^st Battalion, Teleprocessing Corps). Makhlouf was pictured dead in the video released by Qassam.⁸¹ Others such as Maj. Ido Yehoshua, Company Commander in the Israeli Air Force’s Shaldag Unit⁸², and Cpt. Rom Shlomi, commander of the Reconnaissance Department in the Shaldag Unit, were also killed here.

52. Nahal Oz base is located less than a kilometre from the Gaza border. Based on what has been publicised, Nahal Oz is the site of the largest number of Israeli military casualties (66), with most of these soldiers from the 13^th Battalion of the Golani Brigade or surveillance troops from Unit 414 of the Combat Intelligence Collections Corps. Squad commanders in the Golani Brigade Staff Sgt. Nehoray Levi Atimay and Staff Sgt. Dor Lazimi are from those killed at this location on October 7^th. Video released by Qassam of the offensive⁸³ shows a complex and multifaceted assault on the base. Drones (some with heat detectors) and aerial projectiles are used to dismantle defences on walls, as charges are blown on the separation fence. As gun battles rage, there are grenades thrown by ground troops, whilst drones drop projectiles from the sky onto fighting Israeli forces. The cameras from the aerial drones show the large size of the base, with different quarters and plentiful military vehicles. As the fighting rages, a voice cries out: “These are the sons of Qassam! These are the sons of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin! These are the sons of the Palestinian people taking back that which called the Gaza envelope – all of it is our lands brothers!” There are copious scenes of dead Israeli soldiers. A number of prisoners are taken from this location. From them, rather famously, are five soldiers who are thought to have been working as observers in the base: Liri Albag, Karina Ariev, Agam Berger, Daniela Gilboa and Naama Levy. They were pictured being captured at the base, whilst cell phone footage later placed them inside of an Israeli military vehicle taken into the Gaza Strip.⁸⁴ The Nahal Oz offensive is notable too because its proximity to the Gaza Strip meant that many non-Qassam elements (from other factions, and Palestinian civilians) ended up at the base throughout the course of the day. For instance, in a famous clip where Nimrod Cohen was captured on active duty from an Israeli tank, many Palestinians⁸⁵ can be seen crowding around the tank⁸⁶. That notwithstanding, the basic operation – infiltrate, take over, capture and return – can be deduced from the footage.

53. The attack on the Erez Crossing base too was recorded, with footage of the attack uploaded by Qassam’s military media⁸⁷. That footage shows charges being set to pierce the large wall of the base. There are firefights, and many dead Israeli soldiers are shown. An Israeli flag inside of a building is ripped from a window and thrown to the ground. In GoPro footage from the attack released by Israeli channels, a Qassam fighter is shot and injured. He is then approached by another fighter who encourages him to recite the Islamic testimony of faith and takes the camera. Soon after, the second fighter is also shot in the fighting at the base and is heard taking his final breaths. Eventually Qassam gained temporary control of the base. Later, a bulldozer would smash through the breach created at this area in the fence, creating one of the most widely circulated images from October 7th.⁸⁸ From the Israeli soldiers killed in this location are Staff Sgt. Daniel Moshe Danino (Golani), Staff Sgt. Roey Weiser, Staff Sgt. Max Rabinov, and Staff Sgt. Or Mirzrahi.

54. Paga (Magen Be’eri) base is a military position a few hundred metres east of the Gazan fence. Many have remarked, that keeping so many military installations so close to the Gazan fence was one of the biggest strategic failures of the Israelis. According to a Haaretz article, twelve soldiers were killed in the attack on this location, including Lit. Dekel Suisa, Sgt. First Class Itamar Ben-Yehuda and Sgt. Yakir Levi⁸⁹. In a Qassam video of the attack⁹⁰, there are number of dead soldiers’ bodies filmed following gun battles, as well as many military vehicles. At the end of the clip, one of the fighters speaks to the camera with a helmet in his hands: “We want this video to reach the entire world. God willing, this is the helmet of a solider. We went into every corner and with our pure feet, we stepped into every single hiding place. There were no men to fight us.” Human Rights investigator Chriss Cobb Smith referred to Qassam’s breaching of the perimeter and killing of such many soldiers as “staggering.”⁹¹

55. Urim SIGNIT Base is located about 10 miles inside of Israeli territory and so is much deeper than the other locations heretofore discussed. It is 'Israel's' most important intelligence gathering installation, and it collaborates closely with the Mossad.⁹² Lt. Col. Alon Eviatar, member of the reserves and former officer in Israel’s 8200 elite intelligence unit, has described it as “the largest and most significant intelligence base in Israel, one of the country’s greatest assets… It was a top priority for them [Qassam].” Upon arriving at the base, reports have it that the Qassam unit detonated an explosive at the entrance to the underground bunker which synthesised data from across the world.⁹³ Though it’s not known publicly what information precisely might have been accessed/seized, Abu Obaidah would summarise what was achieved at Urim in an operational update given on October the 8^th: “…a number of our Mujahidin were able to safely retreat from Urim base which houses the intelligence unit 8200, after completing their objectives there and killing a large number of enemy forces.”⁹⁴

56. The base at Sufa is notable as it was mentioned by Abu Ubaidah, whilst at the same time the corresponding footage of the attack was released through Israeli channels⁹⁵. Not only that, but there are multiple angles of this offensive, shown on Israeli television, which show a Qassam squad engaged in firefights on roads, and inside of the base itself. As the fighting ensues, fighters are seen taking rifles from dead Israeli soldiers, radio comms are overheard with calls being made for additional ammunition, and at one stage a Qassam fighter shouts that more than 10 Israeli soldiers have been killed. From those killed are Sgt. Gali Roi Shakotai, Staff Sgt, Ofire Melman, Sgt. Segev Schawartz, and Capt. Eyal Klein.

57. In extended GoPro footage broadcast in a report on Israeli Television, a young man from Gaza, Ahmed Sufian, takes part in an offensive on a site which leads to him killing two soldiers and seizing a Tavor rifle. Though the dead soldiers are cut out of the version of this broadcast viewed for this report, the Tavor rifle seized is produced by Israel Weapons Industries whose website states the arm was produced ‘in close cooperation with the Israeli Defence Forces.’⁹⁶ It is the ‘primary assault rifle’ for all IOF infantry units and special forces. Throughout the offensive, Ahmad shouts euphorically about liberating the lands of Palestine: “These are our lands! I’m strolling through them! And what comes next is the liberation of Palestine!” After the firefight in which the soldiers are killed, he turns the camera around to show his face and says the following: “[My name is] Ahmad Sufian Ibrahim Abu Hadda Abu Islam. I’m 24 years old. Here I’ve seized from them a Tavor rifle, and so far I’ve killed two of their soldiers. And with this morning, with this great achievement, we ask Allah for a clear triumph, and we ask Allah for a great victory, and we ask Allah to grant us martyrdom after [we have] dealt heavy losses to the enemy. And this is the least we can offer for the sake of our religion, to give aid to our Prophet, and to give support to our Aqsa. Peace be upon you.”⁹⁷ Ahmed, 24 years old, would have been born on the cusp of the first Intifada, and will have lived virtually all of his sentient life under Israeli siege. At the end of the broadcasted clip, he is shot and killed.

58. On the 7^th, and in the days following the launching of operation Toofan Al-Aqsa, Qassam military media would release videos of 11 separate operations: Re’im military base, Ayn Habshur, an armoured support site belonging to Kissuim Battalion East of Khan Yunis, Nahal Oz, Amitai, Paga, Zikim, Erez, Be’eri, Kfar Azah and Kerem Abu Salem. Those clips, in general, show the intended operation in practice: commandoes leave Gaza, they attack sites, and then they return to Gaza after taking prisoners. Uploaded by Qassam as reflecting the operation they claim to have carried out, that content must be taken seriously when attempting to study the events of October 7^th. There are more locations mentioned than video evidence for, and there are likewise many locations for which publicly accessible information is scarce. Hence, of course, truly transparent investigation becomes necessary.

59. In 1994, Hamas leader Dr Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi published four principles relevant to Palestinian resistance on an early website belonging to the movement. The second of those principles referred to the condition of material asymmetry which existed, and still does, between Palestinian fighters and the Israeli army. Miri Eisin, a former senior intelligence officer in the IOF, spoke about Hamas utilising, on October 7^th, ‘military tactics to carry out a terror attack.’ For her, ‘their success wasn’t tech; it was preparation.’⁹⁸ In line with what the martyr Rantisi said, we agree that preparation and strategizing was necessary to overcome the Israeli army’s billion-dollar defences. However, we say that our fighters utilised military tactics not to carry out a ‘terror attack’, but to carry out a military operation. It is that operation, where the wall besieging the Palestinians came down, and the Gaza division was routed despite the asymmetry between the two sides, indeed that David and Goliath moment, that most outside the Anglosphere remember the Toofan Al-Aqsa operation for. It was a day that vindicated for many the strategy of armed resistance. The Oslo Peace Process had led to political stalemate and expansion of settlements, whilst Qassam commandoes were storming bases tens of kilometres inside of Occupied Palestine. On October 7^th, 2024, Abu Ubaidah would appear again to describe what the Palestinian resistance sees as the success of that day: “…a year after the most professional and successful commando operation in modern times, thanks to God, which targeted a criminal enemy military division that is reinforced with all combat and intelligence systems…”⁹⁹

60. Maybe some faults happened during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’s implementation due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system, and the chaos caused along the border areas with Gaza.¹⁰⁰

61. There remains an outstanding question about just how it was the case that so many non-Qassam Palestinians were able to leave the Gaza Strip on October 7^th. Senior Hamas leaders, such as Khalid Mesh’al, have said that the expectation was that fighting against the Gaza Division would have taken a lot longer and been much more devastating for Qassam commandoes than it was.¹⁰¹ Indeed, sources within the movement have stated that Qassam members were told that accepting to participate in the offensive should be on the basis that they would not expect to return. “The surprise”, Al-Arouri explained, “was that this bloated army which is only good at committing crimes with planes, artillery and tanks… collapsed much quicker than the commanders of Qassam ever expected. The anticipation was the battle would last many hours. [Yet] the Division collapsed in an exceptionally short period of time – like three hours. The Division had been completely taken over, including the headquarters of its commanders, and all the soldiers were either killed, captured as prisoners, or fleeing – wandering aimlessly, leaving the military bases, settlements and kibbutzim [behind]… When the Gaza Division collapsed in unexpectedly quick fashion, and the people in Gaza realised that the borders were open and that the army in the band had been defeated, many civilians, youth and armed people entered [from Gaza]. There was some chaos in clashes that took place, other than that which was planned… the Israeli army collapsed and did not fulfil its obligations either to protect itself, or to protect the civilians. So, civilians ended up in an open area, several armed people entered [from Gaza], and a number of civilians were killed.”¹⁰² When we speak of a state of ‘chaos’ ensuing on the day, the allusion is to this security vacuum which was simply not anticipated.

62. In many instances, those who came through the border did so in line with the general euphoria of the moment. The siege wall had come down, and there was for the first time an opportunity to step into lands our people see as belonging to them following the mass-displacement of the 1948 Nakba. On the day, social media videos went viral of a group of Palestinians running euphorically through a farm shouting ‘Bananas… Our Bananas!”¹⁰³ In another viral clip posted to the Instagram account of Muhammad Fayq, an elderly Gazan man called Abu Sufyan walks through a breach in the siege wall, as he smiles and is cheered by onlookers.¹⁰⁴

63. By tracking the apparel worn in various clips from the day, one recognises that there were numerous affiliated and non-affiliated armed and non-armed Palestinians recorded at several sites in Southern Occupied Palestine. In one clip, at the outskirts of what appears to be a military site, there are several soldiers’ dead bodies scattered. At a certain point, a man in non-military gear approaches one of the soldiers’ bodies bearing a knife, at which point he is told by a Qassam member not to mutilate the dead body in line with Islamic teachings which prohibit post-humous mutilation.¹⁰⁵ In another notable clip, an Israeli soldier is held up in a watchtower along the border of the Gaza Strip. A large crowd of Palestinians surrounds the tower, whilst the man filming the scene screams at the crowd to leave the matter to fighters from the PIJ and Qassam.¹⁰⁶ In a third case, Qassam fighters are seen surrounded by many Gazan civilians. There are at least two dead Zionist soldiers whose bodies are seen on the floor by a vehicle. The man filming, unidentified, shouts to the crowd: “Brothers! Do not desecrate the bodies.”¹⁰⁷ These are a few instances, but many scenes from the day show Qassam, as well as members from other Palestinian resistance factions, attempting to retain control of a situation that quite clearly got out of hand. CCTV footage shared by Israeli channels has Qassam presence, as well as non-Qassam Palestinian presence, at multiple locations, including Kibbtuz Be’eri and the Nova Music Festival.

64. Especially when attempting to determine responsibility and intent, these are aspects of the October 7^th offensive which must be seriously considered. Actions of non-affiliated armed Palestinians cannot be expected to be subject to the same strategies or rules of engagement that was relevant to the planned operation executed by Qassam. Still, there are scenes such as that filmed by journalist Muthanna al-Najjar, who is affiliated with Saudi Al-Hadath news channel. That clip shows a child being apprehended by a Palestinian man in civilian stripes on a busy road – though the exact location is not clear. Al-Najjar tells the man: “he [the child] is from the young… do not harm them… act with wisdom when dealing with these… this is a child – maybe about 10 years old.”¹⁰⁸ Images circulated of the Bibas family – Mother Shiras, and two children Bibas and Kfir – show those Palestinians involved in capturing them bearing arms, but not wearing the recognisable apparel of any Palestinian resistance faction. The man filming shouts that “nobody should harm her… let it be known that we have humanity. Cover her! Cover her!... She has children with her.”¹⁰⁹

65. In a widely circulated image, an elderly Israeli woman posed in her home next to a PIJ fighter who had placed his weapon in across her chest. The lady would later describe their encounter in a media interview: “I said to him do not talk to me because I do not understand what you are saying in Arabic, and I speak Hebrew poorly. I told him I am from Argentina, and I speak Spanish. He told me ‘how from Argentina?’ I said to him ‘Do you watch football?’ Then he replied ‘yes, I love football.’ I told him I am from the place Messi is from. He replied ‘Messi! I love Messi.’ He grabbed my arm from here and gave me the gun. He put the gun down and I pointed with my hand like this, and he took a picture with me. Well, then, he left. Now I hope that he knows that I mentioned him and that I survived because of him. I would like to ask him about my two grandchildren who are there. I pray that God will send him to them because they are two young men like gold.”¹¹⁰

66. The above cases are important for digesting the full image of what took place, even at the hands of non-Qassam Palestinians. Al-Arouri would say, that “[o]ur Mujahideen do not target civilians, and it’s impossible that they carried out the crimes the occupation speaks about [like] rape, killing children, and killing civilians… We do not say that civilians were not killed, but 100% it was not from the plan of Qassam to touch civilians, or to kill them. It was not from the plan of Qassam even [to capture civilian] prisoners… Qassam military youth took army [personnel] as prisoners and returned to Gaza. There were civilians captured – general people entered, took people and brought them back to Gaza. That was not the intention of Hamas…”¹¹¹

67. Many analysts and commentators have effectively described two types of action/attack on the day, without stopping to consider what explains it. Above, Miri Eisin is quoted as speaking about military tactics that were used to carry out a terror attack. In similar vein, Shimrit Meir, a former senior adviser in the previous Israeli government, has said that there “was a unique mixture of state-of-the-art, disciplined planning, combined with… barbarism and brutality.” Her comments are quoted in Washington Post article and describe what ‘began as a highly organized stealth attack, using drone technology to overtake Israeli military observation points’ as soon devolving into ‘a bloody and chaotic rampage.’¹¹² Yet the basic narrative forwarded by Hamas leaders like Al-Arouri explains in basic terms this apparent distinction. This has always been our position and is supported by independent commentators. There was the military operation, planned for and executed by the Qassam Brigades, and then everything else, not planned for, which occurred due to an unanticipated collapse of the Israeli army.

68. Avoiding harm to civilians, especially children, women and elderly people is a religious and moral commitment by all the Al-Qassam Brigades’ fighters. We reiterate that the Palestinian resistance was fully disciplined and committed to the Islamic values during the operation and that the Palestinian fighters only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons against our people. In the meantime, the Palestinian fighters were keen to avoid harming civilians despite the fact that the resistance does not possess precise weapons…¹¹³

69. A consistent problem when discussing Palestinian resistance is the distance that exists between the vernaculars of East and West. To speak in detail of a relationship with Allah is foreign enough, let alone to do so in Arabic whilst engaged in armed conflict with an entity that positions itself as an extension of Western interests. It is important to understand the significance of religious observance within an organisation like Qassam. Our leadership makes copious reference to this aspect of resistance fighters’ personalities, but the weight of these allusions, is often lost not just in linguistic, but also in cultural, translation. We encourage researchers interested in Palestinian armed resistance to explore this further.

70. That reference is crucial, because the rhetoric of Qassam members and leadership is filled with religious references that external onlookers, irrespective of their personal appraisals of them, should assume hold immense weight for our members. Asked what distinguishes the soldier from the Qassam Brigades in a 2015 interview recorded just prior to the pre-dawn meal in the month of Ramadan, one of our Qassam fighters offered the following response: “The soldier in the Qassam Brigades… they are firstly men: men who are not distracted by trade or selling from the remembrance of Allah¹¹⁴. Men from the Truthful, who were cultivated whilst their homes were the mosques, with them being either from those praying, kneeling, or fighting in Jihad. Their homes were not cafes and clubs, singing, engaged in folly and being obsessed with money… They were able to, with God’s favour, reach behind enemy lines because they were alive with their belief that they grew up with, alive with their faith, alive by their remembrance of God, alive by their fasting [and] their recitation of the Quran.”¹¹⁵ The speech of our soldiers often embed verses from the Quran which they will have memorised, or statements of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) and his companions that will have been learnt during the years of their education. In what follows these preliminary remarks should be kept in mind, particularly as relates to the language from publicly accessible instructions given to fighters, and the language employed between fighters themselves. Hamas leaders’ reference to the Islamic values of their fighters should not be considered superfluous. Observance of the commandments of Allah and the teachings of our prophet (ﷺ) supersede our own whims and desires, both individually and as a movement. It is for that reason that allegations of beheading babies, systematic rape, and other unbelievably exaggerated crimes that go against the teachings of our religion, hold no basis. We do not care for this world and strive for the Hereafter. If we were to gain statehood in this world at the expense of the eternal home in the Hereafter, then we have indeed lost the greatest struggle.

71. In his speech announcing the launching of the Toofan Al-Aqsa operation, Qassam commander Muhammad al-Deif gave the following orders: “O righteous Mujahidin. This is your day to make this criminal enemy understand that their time is up. ‘Kill them wherever you find them and expel them from where they expelled you.¹¹⁶’ Do not kill elderly and children yet remove this filth from your land and holy places. Fight, and the angels will fight with you in succession, Allah will reinforce you with angels swooping, and Allah will fulfil His promise to you: ‘we made it Our duty to help the believers.’¹¹⁷”¹¹⁸ The highly rhetorical nature, particularly of public addresses in Arabic, is often interpreted as inherently more violent and barbaric. Yet such style, embellishing speech with poetic allusions and embedded Quranic references, is understood within the linguistic climate as being an expected mark of eloquence. The allusion in the above order not to kill elderly and children, will have been understood as an allusion to the advice given by the first Caliph of Islam Abu Bakr to those soldiers that conquered the Levant region during his rulership. It is subtle in that address, but is still an allusion that carries considerable weight for the accultured listener. What was understood by this may be inferred from how the comments were presented by Saleh Al-Arouri in his Al-Jazeera remarks: “…We have the military plan of the Qassam Brigades, which is as was announced by the brother Abu Khaled Muhammad al-Deif in the first hour when he came out with his official pronouncement and said: “We are going to fight the Israeli army.” And he gave the mujahidin official instructions before they went out, and after they went out¹²⁴. He said do not kill a woman, or the young, or the old – and this is a recording which exists. These were the instructions [given to] our youth.”¹¹⁹

72. In a video widely circulated from the day, from within a house in Southern Occupied Palestine, a member of the Qassam Brigades stands before an elderly woman lying on a bed in front of a younger woman some have speculated is her granddaughter. Looking into the camera, the fighter says that “[t]his scene is a manifestation of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) advice to us – we, Muslim Mujaahidoon – that we do not kill a woman, or a child, or an elderly person, or a worshipper in their monastery. We carried out [today] the will of the Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. We killed the fighters, and we spared the women and the children.”¹²⁰

73. Hamas leaders have often referred to public source materials they say indicate their members acting in line with their rules of engagement. Ismail Haniyeh referred in an official address, a week after the Toofan Al-Aqsa operation, to the footage of Avital Aldajem being released with two children. He said, that “for a long time, Hamas has emphasised that it does not target civilians. It does not target the elderly or the young, despite what the Zionist enemy does. Hamas is a daughter of these people. It is from the tree of this firmly rooted prophetic community (Ummah). It is a national movement for liberation, which belongs to these values… and belongs to this culture.”¹²¹

74. Widely circulated as well, was an interview given to Hebrew media of an Israeli women speaking of her experience with Hamas fighters. She says that she informed the fighters that she had two children with her. Describing what took place, she said: “They look around, then one says to me in English, ‘Don’t worry, I’m a Muslim, we will not hurt you.’ It caught me by surprise. On the other hand, it took a lot of pressure off me… One of them sees bananas on the counter, and he asks, ‘May I eat one?’ and I say, ‘Yes you can.’” The interviewer then asked her about her children, to which she replied: “The older was a more stressed, the youngest didn’t really care she was busy with her tablet. What did scare them a little was the guns. They consulted each other… at the beginning. They spoke in Arabic, and my son asks me ‘are they thinking about how to apologize?’ I told him probably not [smiles]. They stayed at my place for about two hours. By the end of those two hours, one of them closes the door, and they leave… That’s it.”¹²²

75. As attested by many, the Hamas Movement dealt in a positive and kind manner with all civilians who have been held in Gaza, and sought from the earliest days of the aggression to release them, and that’s what happened during the week-long humanitarian truce where those civilians were released in exchange of releasing Palestinian women and children from Israeli jails.¹²³

76. As mentioned previously, Hamas in Gaza initially offered to unilaterally release 85-year-old Yocheved Lifshitz once she was located in Gaza. In the footage of her eventual release, Lifshitz is seen turning back, shaking hands with one of the Hamas guards, and saying Shalom – a Jewish greeting of peace. When questioned by media as to why she did so, she said that it was “because they treated us very nicely.” She continued: “When we arrived there, they first of all told us that they believed in the Quran, and they wouldn’t hurt us and that they would provide us with the same conditions that they have in the tunnels… they took care of all our needs I’ll give them credit for that. They were very courteous. They made sure we were clean, that we ate. We ate the same food they did – pitas with cream cheese, melted cheese, cucumbers. That was a meal for an entire day.”¹²⁴ This October interview was significant, because it was the first time any Israelis held in Gaza had appeared in front of media cameras to speak about their experiences. The interview was received as a PR disaster for the Israelis, with Israeli PR experts calling the decision to put Lifshitz in front of cameras a “mistake.” Israel Hayom columnist Eddie Rothstein commented that “[t]he truth is, you don’t need to be a PR expert to know you can’t have a press conference like this on live TV.”¹²⁵ Ynet columnist Ran Boker called the statement a ‘blunderous move’, as it served ‘to humanize a terrorist organisation.’¹²⁶ Notably, none of the critics questioned the veracity of her account and almost begrudged her for not having been mistreated by our fighters.

77. Following the Lifshitz interview, Israeli authorities reportedly moved to monitor very closely press access given to those released during the negotiations. Israeli news Channel 12 reported that authorities arranged for a special media process for the prisoners post-release. That report alleges that though “there will be no ban on media interviews… they are expected to receive close supervision, and they will be instructed on what to tell the media and what not.”¹²⁷ This reflects similar trends previously mentioned earlier, relating to Israeli monopolies over source information/press access, and how public source researchers are necessarily making conclusions based on controlled slices of information.

78. There are, despite this, some cases worth mentioning. From an objective perspective, this context is worth considering particularly as relates to later statements made post-release by Israelis that will be mentioned below. Many have been vocal in their criticism of the conditions of their detention, and some have claimed that their ‘positive’ comments/stances about Hamas’ treatment of them were given under duress. If it is to be admitted as conceivable that these comments in praise of their good treatment were offered under duress, then it ought to be deemed equally conceivable that testimonies given later criticising their treatment may also have been influenced. In any case, the cases to be mentioned refer largely to primary source materials which ought at least to be considered in good faith, as it is consistent with how Qassam has treated other prisoners such as Gilad Shalit.

79. During the November ceasefire, where exchanges took place for Palestinian women and children kept in Israeli prisons, Qassam media released several videos which stunned many onlookers. In that footage, after weeks of reports about the horrific way Israelis were being treated in Gaza, Israelis were seen smiling, shaking hands, laughing, and waving as they were handed to workers from the Red Cross. Mia Schem for instance appeared in one such video saying that “people were very good, very kind to me… Food good, and the kindness, everything good.”¹²⁸ She had appeared weeks earlier in a video released by Qassam following an operation carried out on an injury she sustained during the process of her being transferred to Gaza. In it she says that “they took care of me, cured me, and gave me medicine.”¹²⁹ In another notable moment from this series of videos, a Hamas member speaks to Israeli teen Itay Regev, 19, from outside of the Red Cross van. Asked whether he is happy, Itay Regev replies with chaim sheli – a term of endearment approximately translating to ‘my life’. The two then share a handshake before waving their goodbyes.¹³⁰ This period of releases also saw some stories which had been widely circulated turn out to be false. Sara Netanyahu, the wife of the Israeli PM, wrote a letter to Jill Biden in which she made references to one of the ‘kidnapped’ women being pregnant.¹³¹ She alleged that the woman, reported to be 35-year-old Natwari Mulkan¹³², gave birth in captivity, though the lady’s mother would later confirm in a Thai Newspaper that her daughter was not even pregnant.¹³³

80. Chen and Agam Goldstein-Almog, taken from Kfar Azza, spoke together in an interview on Israel Channel 12 about their experiences in Gaza. They mention requesting to be kept together: “And indeed, we stayed together, which surprised me. At first, I had an image in my head that I would be shackled in prison…” Chen mentioned being offered to be taken to the salon, and both would engage in exercise. Agam mentions that when she did so, they said “it was very important that I did this.” “Then,” Chen added, “a young man from them did arm wrestling with me, but he brought a towel… Because it’s forbidden for them to touch us.” Agam explained: “For them, women are sacred. Women are like queens.”¹³⁴ Agam would later mention at a MuniWorld Expo in Tel Aviv that she was hurt by how some Israelis responded to her comments. Those responses included ‘too bad you returned’, or ‘you had it easy in captivity.’¹³⁵

81. Danielle Aloni, released during the November one-week ceasefire agreement, wrote a letter in Hebrew the day before she was released, thanking those who took care of her and her 5-year-old daughter Emilia whilst she was in Gaza. The written Hebrew version of that letter was photographed and published by Qassam’s military media, the full text of which is translated in what follows:

“To the generals who have accompanied me in recent weeks, it seems we will part ways tomorrow, but I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your extraordinary humanity shown towards my daughter, Emilia. You were like parents to her, inviting her into your rooms whenever she desired. She acknowledges feeling like all of you are her friends, not just friends, but truly beloved and good. Thank you thank you, for the many hours you spent as caregivers. Thank you for being patient with her and showering her with sweets, fruits, and everything available even when it was not. Children should not be in captivity, but thanks to you and other kind people we met along the way, my daughter felt like a queen in Gaza. In general, she acknowledges feeling like the centre of the world. She hasn’t met anyone on our long journey, from the rank and file to the leadership, who didn’t treat her with gentleness, affection, and love. I will forever be a prisoner of gratitude because she did not leave here with a lifelong psychological trauma. I will remember your kind behaviour, granted here despite the difficult situation you were dealing with yourselves and the severe losses you suffered here in Gaza. I wish in this world we could truly be good friends. I wish you all health and well-being… Health and love to you and your families’ children. Many thanks. Danielle and Emilia”¹³⁶

82. As relates to foreigners (non-Israelis) captured, the Hamas leadership has always stated that the movement had no problem with them and sought to have them released at the earliest possible time. Roongarun Wichanguen, the Thai sister of a released prisoner, commented on her brother’s experience in Gaza. “His face was very happy, and he seemed okay. He said that he was not tortured, or assaulted, and had been fed good food. He was taken care of very well. It looks like he just stayed in a house, not a tunnel.”¹³⁷

83. Lerpong Sayed, the leading Thai hostage negotiator, revealed in an interview with Sky News’ Asia correspondent Cordelia Lynch more details about the conditions the Thai prisoners were kept in. He said, that “[t]hey have all told their families they were well taken care of, well looked after, given shelter, clothes, food and water, and given mental support.” When asked by Lynch whether he thought the Israeli hostages were being treated any different from the Thai hostages, he replied: “No, I think Hamas kept the same standard because they follow Islamic Law, especially protecting children… On every negotiation they confirmed to us that the Thais were captured as war prisoners and would always be treated according to the Quran and Islamic Law, so I was confident Hamas would take care of the Thai workers. And you could see in the workers who were released. They had good interactions with Hamas.”¹³⁸ His response finds some corroboration in various other testimonies where similar remarks are made.

84. Hamas strives to follow the teachings of the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) in all of its actions including the treatment of captives. We are commanded to be kind to our prisoners to the extent that we must prioritise them over ourselves when it comes to feeding and clothing them. We are prohibited from abusing and torturing them. Rape and sexual violence is unthinkable. It is difficult to understand how people are prepared to believe that our elite disciplined forces could participate in depraved acts of sexual violence while participating in the greatest battle of their lives, knowing they may not live to see another day; yet when given the opportunity with captives in their homes for weeks and months, they did not do so, even as the Zionist soldiers raped and tortured our men, women and children in their prisons. Instead, released female prisoners have spoken about how our soldiers would arm-wrestle with them using towels as it was forbidden for them to touch them, how for them, women are sacred, “like Queens”. One released prisoner has even alleged that the only reason she was not raped during her 54 days of detention was because her captor’s wife was in the house and has resorted to claiming she was ‘raped’ “with his eyes”.

85. On the contrary, where there have been incidents of mistreatment of prisoners, we have been quick to intervene and investigate. For example, on 12 August 2024, Abu Ubaidah announced that that “[i]n two separate incidents, two [Hamas] soldiers assigned to guard enemy prisoners fired at a male Zionist prisoner, killing him immediately, and also injured two female prisoners critically.” He added that Hamas had formed a committee to investigate the shootings and that efforts were underway to save the lives of the two injured prisoners.¹³⁹ On 15 August 2024, Abu Ubaidah confirmed that an internal investigation had taken place during the course of which it emerged that the guard in question had acted in revenge upon hearing news that two of his children had been murdered in an Israeli massacre.¹⁴⁰ While we understand the emotions of the Hamas soldiers in question and ultimately hold the Zionist entity responsible for the suffering and danger its prisoners are exposed to, the soldiers’ actions are inconsistent with the teachings of our religion. As Abu Ubaidah himself made clear in his statement at the time, "the incident does not represent our ethics and the teachings of our religion in dealing with prisoners."

86. …In addition, if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently and in the course of the confrontation with the occupation forces…¹⁴¹

87. It is also a matter of fact that a number of Israeli settlers in settlements around Gaza were armed and clashed with Palestinian fighters on Oct. 7. Those settlers were registered as civilians while the fact is they were armed men fighting alongside the Israeli army.¹⁴²

88. When speaking about Israeli civilians, it must be known that conscription applies to all Israelis above the age of 18 – males who served 32 months of military service and females who served 24 months – where all can carry and use arms. This is based on the Israeli security theory of an “armed people” which turned the Israeli entity into “an army with a country attached.”¹⁴³

89. As part of the October 7^th operation, Qassam squads were sent to various kibbutzim and took up positions likewise on roads. The first publicly articulated goal of entering kibbutzim, was to clash with the defensive units at each of these locations. The other, relevant as well to the positions taken up on roads, was to form a barrier of interference, preventing Israeli reinforcements from reaching Qassam forces engaged in clashes at the military sites of the Gaza Division. Inasmuch as these are publicly declared aims, they ought to be taken seriously as they provide a logic behind sending forces to these locations that is consistent with the broader goals of the military operation. The kibbutzim and roads are also worth studying closely, as most, if not all, problematic scenes of ‘civilian’ deaths occur either on roads or kibbutzim.

90. In the military pronouncement where Abu Ubaidah mentioned the various sites that were attacked as part of the October 7^th operation, he refers to “attacking the defensive units of all the kibbutzim in the first line of the Gaza Division – they are twenty-two in number.” Pronouncements over the next couple of days would provide updates to clashes taking place at these locations, and footage released even by Qassam military media would confirm the presence of their fighters at various kibbutzim. A Washington Post report states that as soon as Qassam fighters entered kibbutz Kissufim, they went straight to the house of the community’s head of security – a fact that indicates both planning and intentionality. Shai Asher, a 50-year-old member of the armed security squad in Kissufim has stated, citing conversations with residents, that this was a ‘pattern repeated in other communities.’¹⁴⁴

91. That there are defensive assets at various kibbutzim is not controversial. As previously mentioned, combat forces stationed at kibbutzim were allegedly cut down in size due to the sense of security created by newer border defences, but remained present.¹⁴⁵ Though not located in the South, the Clore Center for the Performing Arts features a playlist of videos on its YouTube Channel with interviews of the defence units of various kibbutzim from the Northern borders of 'Israel', including Kfar Giladi and Manara.¹⁴⁶ Ben Guido, member of the Misgav Am rapid response unit, spoke about Kibbutz Misgav Am itself being “founded initially as means of defending the border.”¹⁴⁷ From October 7^th, there is recorded GoPro footage of Qassam fighters being shot and killed by guards at various kibbutzim. A fighter is shot and killed at Kibbutz Sufa who recites the Islamic testimony of faith before dying, and another is killed by the Community Guard in Kibbutz Kerem Shalom. Ahmad Sufian, previously discussed in this report, was likewise shot and killed in clashes at the gate of a kibbutz in Southern Occupied Palestine.

92. Since October 7^th, many media interviews and articles have been published detailing the roles played by the armed responders at various sites. Imri Bunim has described the role that the rapid response team played at Kibbutz Re’im.¹⁴⁸ Gil Buyum, member of Kibbutz Be’eri’s local security team, was reportedly killed after taking up a weapon to fight once the attack had begun. He was retroactively recognised as a fallen soldier with the rank of warrant officer in the reserves.¹⁴⁹ Israel’s official X account has lauded the efforts of Inbal Lieberman, head of security at Nir-Am¹⁵⁰. The IDSF website (Israel’s Defense and Security Forum) records the role played by the Kibbutz Response team at Kibbutz Zikim under the title ‘Stories of Valor.’¹⁵¹

93. What are these kibbutzim? According to Professor Chuck Freilich, Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor from 2000-2005, kibbutzim in their early days fulfilled a defence function: wherever they could be established would determine and hold 'Israel's' border. Nahal Oz for instance was established explicitly as a military settlement. Per the Jewish National Fund, Nahal Oz was to “supply the IDF with soldiers”, but also “to become a civilian center and serve as the first line of defense against potential future Arab invasions while providing a base of operations and resources for military forces operating in the peripheral regions.”¹⁵² During the 1950s and 60s, many kibbutzim were founded by an IOF group called Nahal on the borders of land seized by 'Israel'. In the Six-Day war, where 800 Israeli soldiers were killed, 200 of them were from kibbutzim, at a time where their inhabitants were only about 4.5% of the overall population. Though emphasis is often placed on the socialist character¹⁵³ of many kibbutzim across 'Israel', their defence functions according to historian Tom Segev were the most crucial role they played. For him, “[t]he most important service the kibbutzim provided to the Jewish national struggle was military, not economic or social. They were guardians of Zionist land, and their patterns of settlement would to a great extent determine the country’s borders.”¹⁵⁴ For many displaced Palestinians in Gaza, kibbutzim are not benign socialist enclaves, but quintessential settlements designed to establish settler control over stolen land.

94. The dynamics established by this history are relevant. In 1956, the head of security at Kibbutz Nahal Oz, 21-year-old Roi Rotberg, was killed by a Palestinian gunman in a nearby wheatfield. The IOF chief of staff Moshe Dayan, in a speech that has been dubbed the ‘defining speech of Zionism’, was moved to eulogise Rotberg: “Yesterday with daybreak, Roi was murdered. The quiet of a spring morning blinded him, and he did not see the stalkers of his soul on the furrow. Let us not hurl blame at the murderers. Why should we complain of their hatred for us? Eight years have they sat in the refugee camps of Gaza, and seen, with their own eyes, how we have made a homeland of the soil and the villages where they and their forebears once dwelt…” By 2023, Gazans had spent 75 years in refugee camps. Dayan’s speech emphasised the responsibilities that the “generation of settlement” had to collectively contribute to the defence and maintenance of the Zionist project due to the inevitability of Palestinian armed resistance. “Our children shall not have lives to bear if we do not dig shelters; and without the barbed wire fence and the machine gun, we shall not pave a path nor drill for water.”¹⁵⁵

95. The ‘People’s Army’ model emerged as the post ’48 profile of the IOF was being negotiated. Heads of the kibbutz movement demanded the formation of ‘an army of the people, working people with pioneering and volunteering values who would combine the values of the legacy of the Haganah and the Palmach, and the settlement heritage.’ Israel Galil, prominent leader within the movement, argued that “the worker, Zionist, pioneer, socialist must be close to weapons, as long as there are weapons in the world… We must be involved in military service and in the systems connected to military service, because it is our obligation and duty of trust to ourselves, a duty of trust to the people, and to the state…”¹⁵⁶ Though these debates took place in the early 50s, the ‘one people’ idea remains palpable in Israeli society, as does the centrality of the armed forces. Compulsory military service provides a source of social cohesion, ‘above even religion.’¹⁵⁷ As Professor Amichai Cohen has written for The Israel Democracy Institute, the army acted as a ‘melting pot for the heterogenous society of a country based on immigration from the four corners of the earth.’¹⁵⁸ By it, a sense of belonging and duty to the homeland is established. Many of the country’s top officials have served as active soldiers: Netanyahu is a veteran of the special forces, whilst Yair Lapid has previously been embroiled in political controversy attempting to prove his own military experience.¹⁵⁹ The impression of ever-present existential threats to the ‘only Jewish state’ means that having a large number of trained reservists through mandatory conscription, all of whom are expected to be ready to defend the country should the occasion require it, performs a practical defence function.

96. There is no doubt that armed individuals, who would not have been registered as soldiers but who will have had military training as reservists, participated in clashes with Palestinians on October 7^th. In instances where these individuals were killed, they would have been registered as civilians, ‘while the fact is they were armed men fighting alongside the Israeli army.’¹⁶⁰ Inbal Lieberman, head of security at Kibbutz Nir-Am, is reported to have distributed weapons amongst twelve of her neighbours to stave off attackers on the day.¹⁶¹ There is even video evidence of armed Israelis fighting side-by-side with Israeli security personnel, like in Ofakim. Due to the breakdown in Israeli military communication on the morning, and the absence of the military, the New York Times has reported that ‘some of the Israeli counterattack took place’ through ‘soldiers or civilian volunteers – including retired generals in their 60s – rushing to the region and doing what they could.’ It also states that ‘sometimes, the [Israeli] commandoes joined forces with volunteers without body armour who had rushed into the fray…’ It adds that some of these volunteer squads were involved in going from house to house.¹⁶² An investigation into October 7^th published in Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth mentions that ‘[c]ivilians, soldiers and officers, police and Shin Bet personnel leaped into battle arenas at their own initiative; they acquired weapons, received partial information, engaged in complex warfare, and sometimes gave their lives.’¹⁶³

97. Leaders within the Islamic Resistance Movement like Abu Ubaidah and Saleh al-Arouri have stated that the intention behind entering the kibbutzim in Southern Occupied Palestine, was to clash with the defensive units therein. One of the Qassam fighters who participated in the operation was interviewed by TRT Arabic. In the interview, he detailed his role as one of the support forces for the Western battalion of Qassam’s elite forces – the Nukhba. In the interview, he recalls receiving instructions for his responsibilities at 09.30 and proceeding thereafter through a breach in the Gaza fence with a group of other fighters. “As soon as we entered the settlement” he says, “they told us that we should not strike the face, that we should not shoot women, and that we must not shoot children. [We were told that] if you find any soldier and he fights with you, fight with him and kill him. If he does not fight with you, take him as a prisoner. Take the largest possible number of prisoners.”¹⁶⁴

98. With the above in mind, there are some significant engagements that took place within kibbutzim. In a clip taken from a Facebook livestream on the day, Qassam soldiers stand behind the camera in front of the family of Noam Elyakim and Dikla Arava. The father, Dikla Arava, has been shot and has a makeshift tourniquet around his leg. The soldiers, who identify themselves as being from the Qassam Brigades, apologise to the family for accidentally shooting and wounding the father. One of them attempts to do so in broken English: “If I know he is here, I not shoot him.” He then reverts to Arabic: “If I had known he was in the room, I would not have shot him.” As the family struggles to understand what is being communicated, a third voice adds in Arabic: “We thought there was army.”¹⁶⁵

99. In other footage taken from a bodycam, a Qassam fighter can be seen walking around in an Israeli residential area. He shouts in English “Hello! Anybody here? I will not shoot.” He then says in Arabic “Al-Qassam Brigades do not shoot civilians.” As the clip continues, he begins to speak with another fighter that is with him. He tells him, “Do not shoot civilians holed up inside.”¹⁶⁶

100. As relates to roads, the UN report states that ‘Hamas armed wing and other Palestinian militants laid ambushes on key roads leading from areas of Israel near the Gaza border (known as ‘the Gaza envelope or in Hebrew Otef Aza), and targeted arriving Israeli security forces.’ The strategic utility of attacks on these locations is quite clear: blocking clear highway intersections meant that soldiers travelling by road, already frustrated by breakdowns in communications, would run into firefights whilst attempting to move between towns and bases in Southern Occupied Palestine.¹⁶⁷ A Haaretz article mentions Israeli police coming to a similar conclusion: ‘…police believe that Hamas planned to control the highways and prevent the army and first responders from reacting.’¹⁶⁸ Many of these roadblocks were on the crucial Road 232. That key road joins many major kibbutzim and bases throughout the Gaza envelope beginning at Kerem Shalom Crossing, and passing through locations like Re’im, Be’eri and Kfar Aza. In these roadblocks, and the fighting there, there are reported instances of Israeli security personnel being targeted, like four from the 551^st Battalion and six members of the police’s Yama anti-terror unit who were killed at Sha’ar Hanegev junction. There are also cases of individuals like Inbar Guyum, discharged medic from the Sayeret Golani commando unit who drove back onto the highway to reinforce a position at a kibbutz and is thought to have been killed whilst on the journey.

101. Hamas is against the targeting of civilians. This has always been our position. In a BBC interview from October 2024, Khalil Hayya, deputy chairman of Hamas’ political bureau, was asked about this issue and responded: “We ordered our resistance fighters on the seventh of October not to target civilians, women and children. The objective was the occupation soldiers, who were always killing, bombing, and destroying in Gaza. We don’t endorse harming civilians. On the ground there were certainly personal mistakes and actions. The fighters may have felt that their lives were in danger.”¹⁶⁹

102. Part of what complicated that arena, was the fact that whilst armoured personnel carriers and other clearly military marked cars were scarcely used on the day, military personnel and others who sought to engage in the fighting did take part in travelling between Israeli towns to counter the Gazan offensive. Reinforcements often organised themselves sporadically. Brothers Master Sgt. (res.) Noam and Sgt. First Class Yishay Slotki, who were in active military service in Beersheba, reportedly raced down to Kibbutz Alumim where they were killed in the fighting. Precisely determining targets was sometimes difficult.

103. There are though other instances which give the impression that Qassam fighters tried to distinguish between army personnel and civilians. In one clip – and it should be noted that the Qassam apparel in this specific clip is not clear – a soldier walks up to a car with an Israeli woman is sat in the back. She appears to be injured. He asks her whether she is army. Her response is not seen or heard in the clip, but it is assumed that she somehow responded in the negative. This is as the man then turns around to another and says “No, it’s haram, nobody shoot her.”¹⁷⁰ In another instance, an Arab bus driver named Suheib Abu Amer Razeem is questioned by Qassam soldiers close to the site of the Nova Music Festival. In the footage, he is asked repeatedly “Where are the soldiers?” Thereafter, Suheib was taken to Kibbutz Be’eri where he was killed after IOF commander Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram ordered that two tank shells be fired at the house where he was being kept. His family reports being told by Israeli police to “go ask Hamas”, when they attempted to track down his whereabouts.¹⁷¹

104. While much has been made about what occurred at the Nova Music Festival, it was never the intention of Qassam to target the festival which took place near Kibbutz Re’im. Qassam squads did attack Re’im military base, and held positions on the road in and around the location of the festival but they had no idea the festival was even taking place. This is again supported by later reports by the media. According to a Haaretz report¹⁷², senior Israeli security officials estimate that Hamas officials did not have advance knowledge that the Nova Music Festival would be taking place. The festival itself was initially planned for Thursday and Friday and was only extended to the Saturday on the Tuesday of that week at the organiser’s request. Also, the arrival of fighters to the festival was from Road 232 and not from the direction of the border, suggesting too that it was not an intended target. A Guardian investigation likewise has it, that the Nova rave was ‘not among the initial targets.’¹⁷³

105. Command responsibility in the case of the music festival is important. The festival was held in very close proximity to Gaza – so close that Lt. Col. Sahar Fogel, Gaza Division operations officer, had opposed the festival taking place so close to Gaza as it was a “needless security risk.”¹⁷⁴ Though the security concern was rocket fire and not an incursion, that proximity meant that when the separation fence around Gaza came down, the Nova Festival was a location visited by many affiliated and non-affiliated armed Palestinians. In one notable clip from dashcam footage from 09.23 that morning, a man wearing a red t-shirt, with no body armour or recognisable insignia/military apparel shoots at an injured man from point blank range who was on the ground behind a car. At the end of this first clip, a man in full Qassam apparel appears.¹⁷⁵ In later footage from 12.12 that afternoon, the dead body is in the same place as a new group (non-Qassam) arrives to loot that location.¹⁷⁶ There is quite clearly no order at this point. The sequence of events implies the presence of multiple elements at the same time, in an area where according to multiple reports, Qassam leadership did not anticipate there would be an active music festival taking place.

106. Other Israeli testimonies confirmed that the Israeli army raids and soldiers’ operations killed many Israeli captives and their captors. The Israeli occupation army bombed the houses in the Israeli settlements where Palestinian fighters and Israelis were inside in a clear application of the Israeli army notorious “Hannibal Directive” which clearly says that “better a dead civilian hostage or soldier than taken alive” to avoid engaging in a prisoners swap with the Palestinian resistance.¹⁷⁷

107. The Hannibal Directive is an IOF protocol designed to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers by enemy forces. Introduced in 1986 following the abductions of IOF soldiers in Lebanon and subsequent prisoner exchanges, the directive is named after the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca who committed suicide by drinking poison to avoid being captured by the Romans after a defeat in the Battle of Zama. Typically, the existence and application of the directive has been kept a secretive matter, regarded, understandably, as controversial. The full text of the directive has never been published, and Israeli military censorship forbade any discussion of the subject in the press until 2003.

108. Just as its referenced in the HND, there are many earlier references within the movement to the use/application of the Hannibal Directive on October 7^th. In a poignant reference, on the day following the launching of operation Toofan Al-Aqsa, Abu Ubaidah mentioned that “…our Mujahidin have confirmed instances of the enemy killing a number of their [own] prisoners after the Mujahidin managed to capture them.”¹⁷⁸ In the interview given by Saleh al-Arouri on October 12^th, the doctrine would be named explicitly: “Another point which I want to be made clear. The Israeli army has a doctrine they refer to as Hannibal. What Hannibal means, is that if hostages are taken, or prisoners end up with the enemy, then the Israeli army has the right to systematically kill the hostages and prisoners, along with those who have taken them prisoner. And this doctrine was practiced.”¹⁷⁹

109. An Investigative article by Ronen Bergman and Yoav Zitun in Yedioth Ahronoth on the October 7^th offensive revealed that by midday, Israel’s Southern Command still ‘did not understand what Hamas’ goals were, where their forces were deployed and how they operate, the control of intersections, the concurrent attacks on posts and on civilian settlements.' What they could see though were videos of hostages being taken, at which point the IOF ‘decided to return to a version of the Hannibal Directive.’ The article states, that ‘at midday of October 7^th, the IDF instructed all its fighting units to perform the Hannibal Directive in practice, although it did so without stating that name explicitly.’ The instructions were to stop ‘at any cost’ Hamas operatives from returning to Gaza. Soldiers from Israeli elite units reportedly examined the area only between the Gaza Envelope settlements and the Gaza Strip and found approximately 70 vehicles that had been hit by fire from helicopter gunship, a UAV or a tank. By the end of the day, drone squadron 161 alone “performed no fewer than 110 attacks on some 1,000 targets, most of which were inside Israel.”¹⁸⁰ Other reports add that breakdowns in communications meant that Israeli military personnel relied on informal channels like WhatsApp groups to learn the locations of Palestinian fighters on the day.

110. Some Israelis who survived the directive have discussed its implementation, corroborating what Abu Ubaidah mentioned on October 8^th, and what investigations have since revealed. Shani Goren, 29-year-old resident of Kibbutz Nir Oz, spoke to Israeli Channel 12 about an Israeli combat helicopter’s high-calibre bullets killing all the Palestinians in the car with her, along with a fellow Nir Oz resident Efrat Katz. Sharon Cunio who survived the same attack, lambasted Netanyahu and his war cabinet for, amongst other things, “the helicopter that shot at us on the way to Gaza.”¹⁸¹ Likewise, there are instances of Israeli soldiers admitting to executing the directive. In an interview with Israeli Channel 13, Capt. Bar Zonshein discusses how he fired tank shells at vehicles driving towards Gaza near Kisufim – about two kilometres from the Gaza fence. He says that he thought a pile of people he witnessed in a Toyota were fellow soldiers, and that he decided to open fire. “…I decide that this is the right decision, that it’s better to stop the abduction and that they not be taken.”¹⁸²

111. In a particularly notable incident, as reported in Electronic Intifada, the commander of the national rescue unit of the Israeli army’s Home Front Command, Col. Golan Vach, told a story to media about Hamas fighters executing eight babies in single house in Kibbutz Be’eri. “They were concentrated there, and they killed them and they burned them.” Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram told Israeli Channel 12 on October 26^th that Palestinian fighters had tied up and executed 10 civilians in the kibbutz, eight of them children. Yet according to the two survivors (Yasmin Porat and Hadas Dagan) from the Cohen resident in Be’eri, none of those killed in this location were babies or toddlers. Yasmin Porat, one of the civilians who survived from this location explained instead how Israeli tank shells were fired into the house, killing all the other residents. “They eliminated everyone, including the hostages. Because there was very, very heavy crossfire… I was freed at approximately 5:30pm. The fighting apparently ended at 8.30pm. After insane crossfire, two tank shells were shot into the house.”¹⁸³

112. Famously, the initial 1,400 number given for the number of Israeli deaths was adjusted down to 1,200. As Israeli government spokesperson Mark Regev – currently on trial in Australia for genocide advocacy¹⁸⁴ - explained, “…we had the number at 1,400 casualties and now we’ve revised that down to 1,200 because we understood that we’d overestimated, we made a mistake. There were actually bodies that were so badly burnt we thought that they were ours, in the end apparently, they were Hamas terrorists.”¹⁸⁵ Our narrative document picks up on this point stating that ‘the occupation authorities revised the number of their killed soldiers and civilians from 1,400 to 1,200, after finding that 200-burnt corpses had belonged to the Palestinian fighters who were killed and mixed with Israeli corpses. This means that the one who killed the fighters is the one who killed the Israelis, knowing that only the Israeli army possesses military planes that killed, burned and destroyed Israeli areas on Oct 7.’¹⁸⁶ There is more than enough motive to at least question how many (likely) hundreds of deaths on the day, and how much destruction to vehicles and properties, were in fact because of Israeli artillery fire.

113. The brutal killing of civilians is a systematic approach of the Israeli entity, and one of the means to humiliate the Palestinian people. The mass killing of Palestinians in Gaza is clear evidence of such an approach. ¹⁸⁷

114. The suggestion that Palestinian fighters committed rape against Israeli women was fully denied by the Hamas Movement. A report by the Mondoweiss news website on Dec. 1, 2023, among others, said there is a lack of any evidence of “mass rape” allegedly perpetrated by Hamas members on Oct. 7 and that Israel used such allegation “to fuel the genocide in Gaza.”

115. It is a well-known fact that the Israeli official narrative had always sought to demonize the Palestinian resistance, while also legalizing its brutal aggression on Gaza¹⁸⁸

116. On a phone call to US President Joe Biden, Netanyahu said that “they [Hamas] took dozens of children, bound them up, burned them, and executed them.”¹⁸⁹ Israeli journalist Yishai Cohen had an interview with an IOF officer that was, according to him, offered by the IOF spokesperson. In that interview, it was claimed that a row of murdered babies were found, hung on a laundry line. Though the interview was soon deleted, he mentioned in a tweet that the IOF officer still insisted on the accuracy of the story.¹⁹⁰ Eli Beer, head of Ihud Hatzalah claimed to have seen a pregnant woman who had the baby cut from her stomach, stabbed and burnt in the oven, after which she herself was shot in front of the rest of her family.¹⁹¹ These comments specifically were offered at a summit for the Republican Jewish Coalition in the United States – the country which is the primary funder and facilitator of the Zionist entity’s aggression on Gaza.

117. This atrocity propaganda was exploited to provide legitimacy for the Israeli genocide in Gaza, with the damage already done when eventually, and inevitably, such narratives were rebutted. It is indicative of the demonisation of the Palestinian people that such narrative space even exists where such tales could be narrated and believed – that one might be immediately prepared to entertain the idea that the Jew-hating Arab chose to give his life for the luxury of cutting off and playing with an Israeli woman’s breast, as if that is even anatomically possible.¹⁹²

118. This entire annex reflects aspects of the October 7^th operation that receive little emphasis in the English media. Rarely are there discussions about the nature of the operation. Rarely is the legitimacy of Palestinian resistance fighters utilising armed resistance acknowledged – a reality which renders even the targeting of military objectives ‘terrorism.’ When all the information concerning the day is taken seriously, it becomes impossible to say that what took place was a wanton pogrom designed to kill as many Jews as possible. Faced with a situation that was simply impossible to sustain indefinitely, against an occupation which could not be checked by any peaceful means, an operation was planned, prepared for, and executed, which attempted to retrieve the rights owed to the Palestinian people. Without denying that there were unfortunate occurrences on the day, a future truly transparent and independent investigation must review all possibly available source information and take seriously the command structure relating to the operation, the numerous actors who eventually participated, articulated laws of engagement, and the numerous military objectives identified, selected and attacked.