Appendix 04
(Memo prepared by Hamas Political Bureau in 2000 just before the eruption of the second Intifada)
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
First: Definition
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a Palestinian Islamic struggle (mujahidah) movement whose supreme frame of reference is Islam and whose goal is the liberation of Palestine.
Second: Phases of evolution and development
A- The Movement's historic roots: (1946-1967)
Hamas is considered the "the intellectual and dynamic extension of Jama'at Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in Palestine whose foundations were laid in the 1930s and 1940s when Ikhwan branches were founded in Yaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem and Gaza. Upon the increase in the number of the branches, the group organized a conference for the branches of the Ikhwan in Palestine which convened in the city of Jerusalem from 29 to 30 March 1946 with the aim of unifying and coordinating the efforts of the branches to confront the Zionist project. The second conference convened in Haifa in October 1947 when the conferees announced "the determination of the Ikhwan to defend their country with all means and their readiness to cooperate with all the national associations to serve this purpose." The role of the Ikhwan reached its zenith in Palestine during the participation of the brigades of the Ikhwan volunteers from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq in the battles that raged against the Zionist gangs on the even of the Nakbah (catastrophe). The group continued its political and social activity in the wake of the Nakbah; one of its most significant accomplishment was foiling the project to re-settle the refugees in the north of Sinai in 1955 and mounting a number of operations, particularly from within the Gaza Strip, across the borders against the Zionist enemy just before 1956.
B- The phase of preparation for launching the movement's project (1967-1980)
The 1967 defeat and the consequent occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and other Arab lands, namely Sinai and the Golan Heights, had numerous repercussions vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue. The most important repercussions were:
1. The role of Arab governments in as far as the Palestinian issue was concerned shrunk in favour of the popular role, which assumed the form of military resistance against occupation.
2. The role of the Palestinian people in confronting the occupation was bolstered and deepened; the entire people, with all their resources and factions, ended up in direct contact with the occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Pursuant to that reality the movement had to face up to new challenges at the level of thought and practice.
3. A comprehensive reappraisal of all the intellectual and political trends during that phase opened the way for the launch of the resistance programme and for the Islamic awakening across the Arab and Islamic regions as an expression of the need of the peoples of the Ummah (pan-Islamic community), including the Palestinian people, to search for their historic identity and cultural affiliation in light of the vacuum and shock caused by the devastating 1967 defeat.
In the shade of these developments, the Palestinian Ikhwan inside the homeland and in the Diaspora proceeded along two paths:
The first path: Participating in direct military action against the Zionist occupation along the front that was available at the time, namely the Jordan River front. The Ikhwan operated from what was known at the time as the "camps of the sheikhs" that were existed under the umbrella of the Fatah movement from 1968 to 1970. The activity came to an end as a result of the Black September events. Ikhwan volunteers from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf countries and other places contributed to the experience.
The second path: Establishing the organizational infrastructure for a jihadi (struggle) project against the Zionist occupation in Palestine in particular and to confront the Zionist project in general.
To accomplish these objectives the Ikhwan undertook to work in the following fields:
1. Arouse the enthusiasm of the members of the Ikhwan to work in the field of Da'wah (calling people to Islam) and social reform.
2. Attract the youth, especially university graduates, to join the ranks of the Ikhwan. The group did indeed benefit from the opportunities made available to Palestinian students to pursue their university education abroad in attracting educated cadres who later on provided the solid foundation as well as the leadership of the movement.
3. Vitalize the process of building mosques in Palestine considering that they constitute a principal source of influence in society.
4. Establish numerous charitable and social institutions; these included Al-Mujamma' Al-Islami (The Islamic Centre) and Al-Jam'iyah Al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Society) in the Gaza Strip and a number of Zakat committees and charitable foundations in the West Bank.
5. Move within the Palestinian people inside Palestine and in the Diaspora with the aim of attracting support and membership, encouraging work for the Palestinian cause in confrontation of the Zionist project and reasserting the Islamic dimension of the conflict.
6. Construct frameworks and institutions to support the Palestinian people inside Palestine and founding a number of platforms for Palestinian student activism in the various arenas and around the world. The movement succeeded during that phase in building a solid organization foundation supported by an institutional edifice that geographically extended across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It was able too to restore some aspects of Islamic observance in the public sphere inside Palestine.
C- The Founding Phase (1980-1987)
This is the phase that witnessed, in interdependence, a continuation of the process of construction on the one hand and joining the activities of the national resistance campaign on the other. During this phase, the movement sought to strike a balance between, on the one hand, horizontal expansion and attracting members and on the other hand vertical expansion in terms of attending to education and reinforcing specialization within the organization and forming the appropriate apparatuses to provide for the needs of the phase of open resistance against occupation, the phase during which the "Hamas" comprehensive project of jihad was crystallized intellectually and organizationally. Some of the most significant stations that mark this phase are as follows:
1. The emergence of the Islamic student action through the creation of Islamic blocs inside the universities of the occupied land and in some Arab and Western countries.
2. Expanding the construction of mosques and affirming their roles in da'wah, guidance and social change.
3. Preparing for the launch of military action against occupation. Some of the movement's early military formations were uncovered and disbanded, especially the military organization led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in 1984.
4. Proceeding in the direction of grassroots resistance action and mobilizing the internal ranks of the movement toward the same objective. This was expressed in terms of what was called the 'mosque revolutions' of 1981, 1982 and 1983. The mobilization reached its zenith with the martyrdom of Jawad Abu Sulmiyah and Sa'ib Dhahab at Birzeit University in 1986. Numerous confrontations took place at the Islamic University afterwards. The Israelis cordoned the university more than once wounding and detained many of its students.
5. Forming the specialized apparatuses within the movement such as the one called the "Munazzamat Al-Jihad wa Al-Da'wah" (MAJD), which constituted the movements security apparatus in 1985, and such as the military apparatus called "Al-Mujahidun Al-Filastiniyun" in 1987, which undertook direct action against the occupation and its collaborators.
6. During this phase the movement worked under a number of banners or names including Al-Ittijah Al-Islami, Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyah and others.
7. Outside Palestine, the movement and its Diaspora branches continued their efforts to complete the building and founding of the movement's project of confronting the Zionist enemy in full harmony and in complementation with the efforts of the movement inside Palestine. The effort outside Palestine focused on the following:
a- building student, intellectual and social platforms;
b- developing and diversifying charitable work so as to support the Palestinian people on the inside and help them remain steadfast;
c- completing the project's vision and its general plans and formations;
d- setting up the action committees and apparatuses needed by the project in the various fields; and
e- encouraging Islamic and national movements in the Arab and Islamic worlds to include in their priorities working for the Palestinian issue and confronting the Zionist threat.
The movement succeeded during this phase in achieving a marked increase in its membership. Most of the new recruits happened to be intellectuals and university students. It also managed to render Islamic observance a cultural norm within Palestinian society whereas it was quote rare in the 1970s and early 1980s. The movement was also able to form a powerful security apparatus thanks to the soundness of its organizational structure and the profound sense of belonging to it by its members. All of these factors contributed positively to enhancing the speed at which the Hamas project came to fruition in the Palestinian arena.
D- The Phase of the Launch (1987-1994)
This is the phase in which the project of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was launched consequent to a preparation that extended over several phases. The proclamation of the project was first made in a communiqué issued in November 1987 and distributed among the masses to warn against the danger posed by the collaborators and expose the methods used by the enemy to trap Palestinian individuals into collaboration. However, the date that acquired special symbolism was the 14th of December 1987. It was considered the day the movement was created and was associated with the eruption of the first Intifada. In fact, the communiqué was not intended to declare the birth of the movement because it had already been in existence and had already been active in the field. What it did, however, was to mark the day on which the masses were informed about the existence of the movement and about the activation of its role in confronting the occupation. The communiqué signalled the start of a phase in which priorities had to be rearranged and to settle for good the dispute about which comes first liberation or change in favour of the former. Resisting occupation became the basic programme of the movement without contradiction whatsoever with the programme of da'wah and the efforts pertaining to social change; it signaled a new phase in which the movement moved to the fore in the expanse field of resistance.
Some of the most significant stations that mark this phase are as follows:
1. The movement played a leading role in triggering the Intifada; it was the first organization to interact with the events and its interaction was the most intense; and it was the most capable organization to lead and mobilize.
2. During this phase, the movement ran the activities of the Intifada independently of the PLO factions that functioned under the banner of United National Command.
3. The movement played a principal role in developing the Intifada from a popular format to qualitative forms of resistance ranging from the kidnapping of soldiers to the war of knives and finally the martyrdom operations. The peak was in 1993 when the movement's military wing "Martyr Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades" carried out 20 military operations in which 32 Israeli soldiers or Jewish settlers were killed.
4. The movement was subjected during this phase to several mass-detention campaigns the biggest of which was in 1989 when Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and the leadership of the movement were detained. Major blows were repeatedly dealt to the movement in 1990 and 1991. However, the movement was able every time to surpass the crisis, rearrange its ranks and learn from the experience.
5. The major blows dealt to the movement were associated with military operations involving the killing or kidnapping of a number of Israeli occupation troops. The 1989 blow was associated with the kidnap and killing of Israeli soldiers Ilan Sa’adon and Avi Sasportas while the 1990 blow followed the Yaffa launch operation in which martyr Marwan Al-Zayigh and struggler Ashraf Al-Ba’luji killed three Zionists. One of the biggest blows dealt to the movement was the deportation of nearly 400 movement leaders and cadres to Marj Al-Zuhur in South Lebanon. The background to this was the capture and killing of Israeli officer Nissim Toledano. The movement's deportees were able to turn their deportation into a political and media protest and a heroic feat so much so that the enemy was forced to return them to Palestine.
6. The movement rejected what went on of open or secret negotiations between the Zionist side and the PLO and expressed its position through communiqués, statements and other forms of political expression. At the time, preparations were being made on the ground for concluding the Oslo Accords. The deportation came within that context.
During that phase, the movement assumed a leading position in resistance and military action. It greatly expanded its membership and gained considerable respect in many Arab capitals. This represented the start of the movement's external relations. That phase proved the soundness, effectiveness and correctness of the measures and development phases of the movement's project, whose effectiveness, continuation and ability to overcome crises, with the Grace of Allah, were guaranteed.
E- The Post-Oslo Phase (1994-2000)
This is the phase in which the movement stood in the face of the tide of peaceful political settlement with the Zionist enemy in the aftermath of the conclusion of the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993. The movement emerged as the main armed faction to continue the resistance and the jihad against the Zionist occupation, a task for which it made enormous sacrifices offering scores of martyrs and hundreds of prisoners and detainees. The campaign against the movement peaked in 1996 in the form of an alliance among local, regional and international powers as expressed by the Sharm Al-Sheikh Summit – or what was called then the war on terrorism summit – convened in the aftermath of the revenge attacks carried out by the movement in retaliation for the assassination of martyr Engineer Yahya Ayyash. Despite the measures adopted to undermine the movement and suppress its resistance, the movement was able to come out of that crisis much stronger and much more effective both militarily and politically. Subsequent events vindicated the movement and proved its credibility of its position vis-à-vis Oslo and the philosophy of a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the region. The movement proved capable of adapting to political and security changes, both internally and externally, in a manner that preserved the movement's jihad project and its political and social programmes.
Conclusion:
Since it started, the Hamas project passed through different circumstances and several phases. At every phase since the Haifa conference of 1947, it was absolutely clear that the Zionist project was absolutely and radically contradictory to our religious beliefs and national interests; it was both necessary and inevitable to clash with it, to do all that is possible to confront it and to provide for the proper circumstances for eliminating it. Subjective and objective circumstances prevented the Hamas project from materializing on the ground for some time. But when the right conditions became available, the project started rebuilding itself, putting up its structure and crystallizing its plans and policies. On 8 December 1987, the day on which the first Intifada erupted, was the day the Hamas movement was launched officially and practically. Its first communiqué was issued on 14 December 1987 to proclaim to the public the emergence of the movement having attained full growth of its structure and clarity of its vision about its role in confronting the Zionist occupation.
Third: The Conflict with the Zionist Project in the Thinking of Hamas
Hamas considers the conflict with the Zionist project a civilizational and existential conflict that cannot be ended without eliminating its cause, which is the establishment of the racist colonial Zionist entity in the land of Palestine.
The movement's view of the Zionist project is based on the following parameters:
1. The Zionist project represents the convergence of Western colonial interests in the region with the interests of the Zionist movement and its ambitions in the land of Palestine, which are often justified in the name of ideological myths espoused by Jewish and Christian Zionists.
2. The Zionist entity is a colonial settlement entity that is based on the idea of uprooting the Palestinian people and driving them away from their land by force to replace them with settlers using all means of terrorism.
3. The Zionist project is an expansionist one; it seeks to impose its hegemony on the entire region and control its resources. As such, it represents a real danger not only to Palestine but also to the entire Arab and Muslim world.
4. This project does not accept coexistence with others; it is dominated by the inclination toward hegemony and imposing control over others to serve the interests of the Zionist Movement in the region and the entire world. Therefore, it would be futile to seek to make peace or reach a settlement with it.
5. The Zionist entity constitutes and effective colonial means of breaking the geographic contiguity among the Arab countries in Asia and Africa; it is simply aimed at thwarting any renaissance project in the region. It does, thus, seek to accomplish the colonial goals of obstructing the project of Arab and Islamic unity.
Fourth: Hamas vision of Liberation
Hamas believes that the battle for the total liberation of Palestine from the Sea to the River will not succeed unless the efforts in three main circles are intertwined. These are:
a- The Palestinian Circle: This is the spearhead in the battle of liberation; its role is summed up in maintaining the jihad and the resistance, continuing to adhere to the national rights and invariables and keeping the flame of jihad on so as to keep the issue alive within a national program whose basis is resistance and the existential antagonism of occupation until such time when the two other circles are ready.
b- The Arab Circle: Since the Zionist project poses a danger to the entire Arab Ummah, and in view of what Palestine represents in terms of ideological and nationalist dimensions, the role of the Arab Circle in liberation is fundamental and central; the Arab Ummah constitutes the potential force upon which the task of liberation depends.
c- The Islamic Circle: In as much as the Palestinian issue is an Arab issue it is Islamic too; it is of concern to every Muslim on the face of the earth because it is an Islamic endowment land that embraces within it the first of the two Qiblas and the third most important mosque which the Prophet peace be upon him visited during his night journey to the Upper Heavens. All Muslims, both as individuals as well as communities, shoulder the duty of contributing with whatever they afford to the task of liberating Palestine. The Islamic Ummah is considered the strategic depth and the reserve to which the Palestinian people and the Arab Ummah will resort in their endeavor to liberate Palestine and remove the Zionist entity from it.
Fifth: Military Action in Hamas Program
Military action in the Hamas project constitutes the strategic means for the liberation of Palestine and confronting the Zionist project; it is the sole guarantee for the continuation of the conflict and for preoccupying the Zionist entity so as to thwart its expansionism outside Palestine. The movement considers military action the real expression of the legitimacy of rejecting the occupation and resisting its existence on Palestinian soil. This legitimacy derives from Divine religions, international norms and human history.
Military action within the movement is subject to fixed policies; the most important of these are:
1- The conflict with the Zionists is not linked to their religious affiliation but because they occupy our land, desecrate our shrines and violate our people.
2- Resistance, with all its forms, is aimed at ending the occupation and will not stop until it is defeated and ended.
3- Hamas military action is confined to the land of Palestine whether that occupied in 1948 or occupied in 1967.
4- With its military action, the movement does not target civilian Zionists; it only target Zionist military targets. Civilians may, however, be inadvertently hit or may be targeted only in retaliation for the enemy's targeting of Palestinian civilians.
Sixth: Political Action in Hamas Program
In addition to its military program, the movement possesses a political program that is based on mobilizing the resources of the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic Ummah and dedicating them to ending the Zionist project and establishing an Arab Islamic state in the whole of Palestine. It is in the light of this that the movement determines its policies and stances vis-à-vis the various issues different developments. The following are some of Hamas most important policies:
A) Hamas stance toward the Palestinian forces and factions:
1- The movement believes in a national unity based on preserving the national invariables; such national unity is an important underpinning of steadfastness and liberation.
2- Hamas believes that the arena of Palestinian national action is spacious enough for all visions and opinions concerning resistance against the Zionist project .
3- Emanating from the desire to give priority to common denominators and common grounds, Hamas seeks to cooperate and coordinate with all the forces, factions and organizations working in the Palestinian arena.
4- Hamas seeks to bolster joint national action. It believes that any formula for joint Palestinian national action must be based on the commitment to work for the liberation of Palestine and the commitment not to recognize the Zionist enemy or grant it the right to exist on any part of Palestine.
5- No matter how much difference exists in view points or in opinions as to how to do things in the arena of national action, Hamas believes that no one has the right under any circumstances to use weapons or resort to violence to settle disputes or impose views or opinions within the Palestinian arena. It is for this reason that the movement has always exercised self-restraint toward the repressive measures taken against it at certain times. It has been motivated to persevere by the desire to save the Palestinian blood and to serve the supreme Palestinian interest.
6- The movement believes in the necessity of combining all the efforts in the Palestinian arena in order to establish a wholesome Palestinian society that enjoys freedom, equality and political pluralism within the framework of the basic identity and the sublime values of the Palestinian society and the Arab and Islamic Ummah.
B) Hamas position toward the peaceful settlement
1- The movement has repeatedly affirmed that it is not against the principle of peace; but the peace it seeks is that which restores to the Palestinian people their rights and guarantee their independence and sovereignty over their entire land. Such peace can only be accomplished in the shade of strength and steadfastness not in the shade of weakness and capitulation.
2- The movement considers the agreements concluded between the occupation and certain Palestinian parties to be rejected concessions and comprises over the national rights of the Palestinian people and the rights of the Ummah to its holy places.
3- The movement believes that the settlement agreements grant the enemy the right to exist, bestow legitimacy on the its occupation of Palestine and gives it the opportunity to expand and extend by virtue of cultural, economic and political normalization programs with the Arab and Islamic countries; as such they constitute a real danger to the presence and future of the Arab and Islamic Ummah.
Because of the aforementioned reasons as well as other considerations, the movement has rejected the settlement plans and what emanated from them such as the agreement concluded at Oslo, Wye River, Sharm Al-Sheikh and other places. The movement considers all these projects and accords to be attempts to liquidate the Palestinian issue, deny the Palestinian people the right to claim their legitimate rights in their lands and holy places, deny the refugees the right to return to their homes and deny the Palestinians the right to resort to legitimate means to regain their rights. Additionally, they are aimed at denying the majority of the Palestinian people the right to live on their soil and in their homeland. These accords have led to diverting the conflict from the right direction and have had a negative impact on the relations among the various Palestinian forces and factions.
C) Hamas External Relations
1- Hamas believes that disagreement over political developments does not bar it from communicating and cooperating with any party that is prepared to support the steadfastness and resistance of our people against the oppressive occupation.
2- Hamas does not concern itself with the internal affairs of the other countries and does not interfere in their domestic policies.
3- Hamas seeks to encourage Arab and Islamic governments to resolve their disputes and unite their positions toward pan-Arab or pan-Islamic causes. The movement refuses to take sides in disputes standing by one party against the other and refuses to join any particular political axis against another.
4- Hamas believes in Arab and Islamic unity and would support any endeavor in this regard.
5- Hamas demands all Arab and Islamic governments, parties and forces to perform their duty of supporting the cause of our people and in assisting them in their steadfastness and confrontation of the Zionist occupation. It calls on them to facilitate the activity of Hamas and help it undertake its mission.
6- Hamas believes in the importance of establishing close ties with the Ummah's various Islamic and nationalist forces and movements. It had in fact been doing exactly that by means of an extensive network of close relations with the aim of mobilizing the efforts of the Ummah in confronting the Zionist project which is hostile to the Ummah.
7- Hamas believes in the importance of dialogue with world governments and international forces and parties irrespective of their faith, nationality or political system. Hamas does not object to cooperating with any party in the world in the service of our people's just cause and as part of the endeavor to secure their legitimate rights.
8- Hamas does not declare hostility against anyone on the basis of religious belief or racial roots; nor does it oppose any country or organization so long as it does not practice injustice against our people or support the Zionist occupation in its aggression against our people.
9- Hamas is keen on confining to Palestine the arena of confrontation with the Zionist occupation; it would not want to extend the battlefield to any other arena.
10- Hamas seeks to persuade governments and international organizations or institutions to stand by the just cause of our people and to condemn the repressive measures adopted by the occupation in contravention of the principles of international law and the values of human rights. The objective is to form an international public opinion that would pressure the Zionist entity so as to end its oppressive occupation of our land.
D) Hamas position toward members of the other Divine religions
Hamas believes that Islam is the religion of unity, equality, tolerance and freedom. It is a movement with humane and civilizational dimensions; it does not adopt a hostile position against anyone except those who initiate hostility against the Ummah. Hamas believes that living in the shade of Islam is the ideal climate for coexistence among affiliates of the Divine religions; history provides the best testimony to this fact. The movement seeks guidance from the Qur'anic verse that says "There is no compulsion in religion;" and the Qur'anic verse that says " Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loves those who are just."
Emanating from these values, Hamas respects the rights of other faith communities. As for the Christians living in Palestine, Hamas considers them to be partners who share the homeland and who have been subjected to the same oppressive measures to which their Muslim brothers have been subjected at the hands of the occupation authorities; they have participated in confronting the occupation and in opposing its racist policies; and they are an inseparable part of the Palestinian people with full rights and full responsibilities.
Hamas Political Bureau
June, 2000