The HAMAS Case

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REPORT ON

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF PALESTINIANS ON 6 OCTOBER 2023

BY

AHMET SAIT ÖNER & ŞÜHEDA NUR UZUNTAŞ

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. We have been instructed by Riverway Law to provide a report on matters within my expertise in support of the application to the British Home Secretary to deproscribe Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (‘Hamas’).

2. The purpose of this report is to detail the socio-economic conditions that existed for Palestinians on the 6^th of October 2023 and how the Israeli occupying regime and settlement strategy turns Palestinian society into a “control society” with the intention of rendering Palestine increasingly uninhabitable for Palestinians. The systematic violence shows that October 7 was not the beginning point; the wave of attacks initiated on October 7 can be viewed as the intensification of ongoing destruction and elevation of the assault on Palestinians to the level of genocide.

B. QUALIFICATIONS

3. We give this report in our personal capacities.

4. Amet Sait Öner Graduated from Marmara University Faculty of Law in 2003.

5. Dedicated law practitioner and actively participates as a leader in numerous civil society organisations. He has worked on several significant cases, including the impactful February 28 Trials, the pivotal Tahşiye case linked to the July 15 coup attempt in Türkiye, and the Yasin Börü case.

6. He is currently Chairman of the ILKE Foundation. At the ILKE Foundation, he oversaw the coordination and editorial responsibilities for the annual Legal Monitoring Reports.

7. As a member of the Central Executive Board of the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUMDER), Ahmet has been a leading advocate for the oppressed, contributing to vital human rights reports concerning events like the Avrasya Marathon and the July 15 coup trials.

8. Ahmet is also the visionary founder and current director of the Academy of Justice and Knowledge (ADİL), which focuses on empowering future law students with essential knowledge and skills.

9. Şüheda Nur Uzuntaş is a sociologist and researcher specialising in data collection, visualisation, and social analysis. She is a Project Specialist and Researcher in the Sosyal Veri project at İLKE Foundation in Istanbul, Türkiye.

10. She has a Master’s degree in Sociology from Istanbul Medeniyet University.

11. She has written in the field of social thought and policy. As a project specialist in Sosyal Veri, she has published various analyses on Türkiye’s social, economic and cultural issues on our project’s website. Her printed publications include Toplumun Görünümü 2023: Kent ve konut, 2023; The Outlook of Palestine: Palestinian society in data, 2024.

12. She has worked on data collection on a wide range of social, economic, and violence indicators of Palestinian society. She has also publicised data on Palestine through data visualisations and has written a report as a researcher on the socio-economic situation in occupied Palestine.

C. THE SETTLEMENT POLICY AND ONGOING OCCUPATION

13. The Israeli project to settle Jews in Palestine has a long history dating back even before 1948. With the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the groundwork for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, the settlement project became policies of the occupation state. The Partition Plan aimed to divide the Palestinian lands into 56.2% for Jews and 43% for Palestinians, with Jerusalem designated as an “international city” (corpus separatum).

14. After the establishment of Israel as a state and policy toward pursuing the settlement project, the establishment of an independent and unified Palestinian state was made almost impossible. Following that, Israel expanded its occupation into the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967, where settlements were established as part of a broader policy of Zionism by violating UN Resolution 181. This expansion and advantageous position of the occupying regime transformed Palestinian society into a “control society,” which has facilitated the infiltration of occupation into different aspects of daily life for Palestinians.

15. Since 1967, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has grown. This expansion can be viewed as Israel’s de facto annexation policy, whereby it establishes legal and administrative control over the occupied territories without any legal justification.¹ While Gazans are concentrated in the Gaza Strip because of the blockade, people in the West Bank are concentrated in neighbouring areas because of the limitations on movement to facilitate settlement activities in those areas.

16. Citizens of the West Bank have been completely isolated in some areas because of the imposed restrictions. For example, in Hebron, the movement of Palestinians is severely restricted, while Israelis can move freely throughout the city. In 2016, to minimise Palestinian movement in the area, they were prohibited from crossing from one street to another. Amnesty International has labelled these high-level restrictions on an entire population as “collective punishment.”²

17. In the West Bank, there is an increasing Jewish settler population because of the takeover of Palestinian lands. As of March 2024, Israeli occupation forces control 2380 square kilometres of Palestinian land, comprising approximately 42% of the West Bank, with the occupation forces controlling 69% of the C areas (CWRC, 2024). Whereas the Gaza Strip is under total blockade, the Separation Wall restricts the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, infringing on the fundamental human right to freedom of movement. Indeed, it is an indication that Israel is an apartheid regime.³

18. Strategies such as agricultural cooperatives, settlements, colonies, and the construction of the Separation Wall — actions unrecognised by international law — are all part of a broader settler-colonial project. Besides the checkpoints, which are in accordance with the Separation Wall, there are settlements, outposts, bypass roads, military bases, closed military zones, and areas declared by Israel as nature reserves in the West Bank and the other regions in the occupied Palestinian territories.

19. Moshav and Kibbutz are cooperative agricultural villages planned and supported by the Israeli state. They serve to assert control over Palestinian natural resources, aiming ultimately to seize them completely. Moreover, the Separation Wall cuts through the most fertile agricultural lands of the Palestinians, rendering a tenth of these lands unusable and disrupting water sources for farmers.⁴

20. Outposts allegedly built to “ensure security” have been a critical apparatus of the occupation plan. Outposts pave the way for an increase in the Jewish population, facilitate settler violence, and lead to further displacement of Palestinians. While there was only one outpost in 1976, by 2023, the number reached 179. In addition, the number of settlements was only one in 1967, whereas it reached 176 in 2023.

21. The rising number of settlements explains the growth in the settler population, which stood at 190,000 in 1988 and quadrupled to 726,000 by 2022. As the number of outposts increases, so does the violence against Palestinians, who are often forcibly removed from their homes or land to make way for expanded settlements.

D. SETTLER-COLONIAL VIOLENCE

22. The settlement project resulted in the takeover of Palestinians' land and resources and forcibly displaced them, which made settlers colonists as well. The settler-colonial project has been enabled by systematic violence against Palestinians. While the occupation regime has been responsible for the public order and safety of the people in the occupied areas, the Israeli regime has expanded its settlements and colonies and increased the number of settlers.⁵ This policy of de facto annexation implementation is perpetuated by different forms of violence against Palestinians and their rights under humanitarian law. According to Amnesty International, Israel committed 12 distinct violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws.⁶

23. Occupation forces and settler-colonists have violated Palestinians’ right to live. Data shows that Israeli security forces and settler-colonists killed nearly 7000 Palestinians between 2008 and 2024, excluding casualties from the October 7 and its aftermath. ⁷

24. The Zionist regime frequently violated Palestinians’ rights to personal liberty, security, and equality. Yesh Din, a human rights organisation established in Israel and led by Israeli volunteers, well-documented this violation. According to data, 81% of police investigations into incidents of Israelis harming Palestinians or damaging their property between 2005 and 2023 were unsuccessful, and 93.7% of investigations in the West Bank were closed without indictments.

25. The lack of accountability indicates to Israeli settlers that legal consequences for unlawful actions against Palestinians are unlikely. Israeli authorities persist in overlooking the legal protections for Palestinians, who, under international law, are entitled to protection. Local human rights organisations periodically report on this ongoing situation.⁸

26. The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial was also violated by the occupation regime to hinder legal channels for Palestinians seeking justice. No action was taken against Israelis who committed offenses against Palestinians in 2022, while 57.5% of Palestinian victims did not file complaints against perpetrators in 2023.⁹

27. Freedom of movement and rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association are closely related rights violated by the Israeli regime. The presence of checkpoints is unlawful in itself because it limits the freedom of movement of Palestinians. Military checkpoints regularly impede their passage, often accompanied by violence. In addition, any kind of gathering of Palestinians is restricted through Military Order No. 101, the “Order Regarding Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda,” which permits any gathering of ten or more Palestinians to be deemed “political” and, therefore, prohibited.¹⁰

28. The ambiguous definition of “political” gives occupation authorities extensive powers to suppress Palestinians' freedom of expression, protest, and assembly, thus rejecting their fundamental rights through military decree. Amnesty International reports that between 1967 and 2021, over 400 Palestinian aid and solidarity organizations reporting on human rights violations and providing medical and legal aid were declared illegal by Israel without legitimate justification.¹¹

29. When we compare the Palestinians' and Israelis’ life conditions, Israelis living in Israel do not face such human rights violations, which underscores the extensive rights violations against Palestinians. Israel operates as an apartheid regime¹², systematically discriminating against Palestinians in Gaza and other occupied territories.¹³

30. Israel’s policies on settlements, which it actively promotes or allows through inaction, violate Palestinians' rights to equality and non-discrimination. This settler-colonial policy also violates Palestinians’ right to adequate, decent housing. The practice of establishing settlements directly denies their housing rights.

31. The United Nations' 2001 Declaration on the Fourth Geneva Convention reaffirms that Israeli settlements in Palestine violate international humanitarian law while highlighting their illegality. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from forcibly displacing the population in occupied territories.¹⁴

32. Israeli authorities continue to issue demolition orders regularly to evict Palestinians from their homes forcibly. According to data, between 2006 and 2024, nearly 6000 houses were demolished by the Zionist regime. The consequences of these actions have left thousands of Palestinians without homes, casting them into a struggle for shelter and stability.¹⁵

33. In addition to demolition orders, evacuation orders are issued in certain areas, forcing entire communities to relocate. One example is the nomad communities that face settler-colonial violence and are targeted by displacement orders of the occupation authorities. The Palestinian Bedouins are semi-nomadic communities living in rural areas of the West Bank, primarily engaged in agriculture and livestock farming. Before the establishment of Israel, Bedouins made up 25% of the population in the region, and under Israeli rule, they constituted 10% of the minority Palestinian Arab population within Israel.¹⁶

34. They also damage essential infrastructure, such as water and electricity, depriving Palestinians of basic needs and pressuring them to abandon their homes. According to PCBS data, 46% of households in Gaza experienced daily water cuts, and 42.6% had more than one water outage per week in 2020. In contrast, 52.6% of households in the West Bank did not experience water cuts, while 27.2% experienced multiple outages per week.¹⁷

35. According to OCHA data, Gaza received only an average of 7 hours of electricity per day in 2017 and 2018, which increased to 12 hours in 2019, 13 hours in 2020 and 2021, but fell back to 10 hours in 2023. Following October 7, 2023, the ongoing conflict resulted in Gaza receiving no electricity at all by 2024.¹⁸

36. Local production is also the target of settler-colonial violence to seize produce and materials. Various reports have shown most of the attacks targeted the Palestinians’ properties, agricultural lands, and even olive trees. During the harvest seasons, attacks by settler-colonialists, who are backed by Israeli police, had risen against Palestinian farmers. Moreover, attacks by settler-colonialists against olive trees have a long history. Tens of thousands of olive trees have reportedly been uprooted or burned by occupying authorities and settlers since 1967. These attacks on trees have severely impacted the livelihoods of Palestinian farmers.

37. In the West Bank, agricultural lands are routinely targeted, and over a two-month period in 2018 alone, more than 2000 trees were damaged, resulting in losses exceeding $100,000 for affected farmers.¹⁹ In 2023, settler militias uprooted or damaged 21,731 trees, and in the first half of 2024, 9957 trees, including 4097 olive trees, were recorded as uprooted.²⁰

38. These attacks, which have become routine for settler-colonialists, occur with impunity, as Israeli police typically fail to take preventive action, often turning a blind eye or even participating. Even when Palestinian farmers file complaints, their grievances rarely reach the courts; between 2005 and 2009, not a single complaint regarding these attacks in the West Bank resulted in a police investigation or indictment.²¹

39. Moreover, Israeli occupation forces frequently use arbitrary arrest as a form of violence against Palestinians, often conducted through administrative detention — a process of detaining individuals without charge or trial. This practice has served as a means of both psychological and physical oppression for thousands of Palestinians. The aim of the Zionist regime through administrative detention is to intimidate the Palestinians.

40. Although Israel claims these detentions are necessary for security, Amnesty International indicates that administrative detention is utilised as a form of political imprisonment, facilitating the arbitrary arrest of Palestinians.²² Detainees are given no opportunity to defend themselves, access legal representation, or even be informed of the reasons for their arrest. Administrative detentions can be renewed indefinitely, leaving detainees uncertain about their release dates.²³

41. B’Tselem has documented cases where detainees have been denied family visitation rights for years, including cases involving detained children and released prisoners who are re-arrested under administrative detention.

42. Since 1989, B’Tselem reports that over 22,000 detentions have occurred in the West Bank and Jerusalem.²⁴ The numbers surged during the First and Second Intifadas, and in 2023, after October 7, the rate of administrative detentions reached its highest recorded level. The number of detentions in the first half of 2024 exceeded the total for the previous year. Administrative detentions usually last up to six months, but most are extended at least once. The duration of these detentions increased in 2023, and by 2024, many had been prolonged to 6-12 months.

43. It's important to note that these detentions are not limited to adults; children are also frequently detained. Data indicates that most detained children are aged 16-18, although children younger than 16 have also been arrested. Between 2008 and 2024, 3,217 children aged 16-18 were detained, while detained children aged 0-16 numbered 626.²⁵ The application of administrative detention to minors is especially concerning, as many children are repeatedly detained without any clear justification.²⁶

44. For decades, Palestinians have endured a daily onslaught of violence from occupation authorities and settler-colonialists. Their fundamental rights — including the right to work, self-defence, housing, freedom of thought, and even the right to life — are consistently violated by Israeli authorities. Analysing data on this violence over the years or by month shows a steady increase in aggression since 2022. The surge in violence outside Gaza since October 7, driven by both occupation forces and settler-colonialists, demonstrates how October 7 has been used as a tool for intensifying these violations.

E. THE OUTLOOK OF SOCIETY UNDER OCCUPATION

45. The outlook of society is illustrated through a range of socio-economic indicators that touch upon different aspects of social life. These indicators include social, economic, infrastructural, and educational aspects influenced by the interplay between the government and the community, and these indicators have evolved under the current conditions in society. In the case of Palestine, these socio-economic indicators have changed within the framework of ongoing occupation.

46. It is crucial to understand that, despite all attempts to increase the Jewish population by the Israeli regime through settlements, demographic balance is still one of the critical aspects of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, Palestinians are still the majority in every region they reside in occupied Palestine. This fact is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the demographic changes in the area.

47. According to current total fertility rates in Palestine and Israel given in the PCBS’ population projections, it was estimated that Palestinians would make up 50.4% of the population in historic Palestine by the end of 2023. This foresight stemmed from the increasing Palestinian population over the years, allowing them to preserve the dynamism of the population. However, because of the ongoing attacks and death toll in the Gaza Strip, the situation at the end of 2023 could not be calculated yet. Israel deliberately attacked or jailed young persons because of the “demographic advantage” that Palestinians hold over the self-determination issue.

48. Because of this dynamism Palestinians have had, the Israeli regime exercises the policy of spatial concentration, which is another mechanism to maintain “control society.” The pressure, restrictions, and limitations imposed by the occupation regime on the Palestinian people have resulted in an excessive concentration of population in certain areas. With an area of only 365 km², the Gaza Strip’s population density is above the average of Arab countries and the European Union.

49. The expansion of occupation beyond the 1948 borders, the establishment of numerous checkpoints, and the imposition of Israeli legal systems in the occupied Palestinian territories have significantly restricted Palestinians’ economy.

50. The tax system imposed by Israel, a result of Israel’s legal framework, involves the occupation regime collecting taxes from Palestinians on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, which has led to significant economic losses. Moreover, escalating conflicts, interventions targeting producers, and tighter restrictions have resulted in substantial losses in Palestine’s value-added economic sectors. As a result, the Palestinian economy is not functioning optimally, which leads to inevitable social suffering, financial dependence, and instability.

51. The Palestinian economy grew in the 1990s, but occupation policies gradually eroded local production. Due to severe restrictions, one of the cornerstones of Palestine’s economy, agriculture, lost its potential and related sectors that enable the poorest communities to work and generate income face economic losses.²⁷

52. When we examine Palestine's economy, we should consider the “occupation costs.” These costs stem from the control mechanism held by occupation forces, which diminished the production income and caused a diminishing in the value-added production. For example, in the agricultural sector, export processes are hampered by several checkpoints and vehicle restrictions, resulting in occupying forces getting “payment.”

53. The pressure of the “occupation costs” has led to a shift in sectors over the years: GDP contributions from agriculture and manufacturing have decreased, while the service sector has emerged as the leading sector of the Palestinian economy. Agriculture’s share of GDP dropped from 12.1% in 1994 to 6% in 2022, while the share of manufacturing declined from 22.2% to 12.1%, highlighting the changing economic landscape under occupation.

54. Although Hamas won the democratic elections, it faced a blockade on Gaza and was banned from Ramallah; it was separated from the Palestinian Authority. Economic disparities between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have deepened over the years. From 2000 to 2022, Gaza's annual GDP growth consistently remained below zero, while the West Bank saw only minimal growth.

55. The GDP growth rates from before 2006 have yet to be matched in the period from 2006 to 2022. Significant destabilising events, such as the Israeli attacks in 2008, 2012, and 2014, along with the ongoing blockade, have further exacerbated the situation. 1995 GDP was approximately $3.3 billion, reaching $19.1 billion by 2022. Since 2006, the West Bank’s share in the economy has risen steadily, comprising 84% of Palestine’s economy in 2023, with Gaza contributing 16%.

56. In a nation with limited economic self-sufficiency, the per capita GDP has been approximately $3,000 from 2012 to 2022. The West Bank has consistently reported a higher per capita GDP than the Gaza Strip, and the gap has nearly quadrupled in recent years. Nevertheless, the per capita GDP remains below the poverty line in both regions. Inflation has risen and particularly impacted the prices of fresh food and beverages. According to data, the poverty rate among individuals in the Gaza Strip has steadily increased over the years and reached 63.6% in the third quarter of 2023.²⁸

57. In 2022 the per capita GDP was $3800, but it dropped by 26% to $2800 in 2023.²⁹ This decline in per capita income has also decreased purchasing power, leading to a higher prevalence of poverty in Gaza compared to the West Bank. Moreover, the purchasing power in Palestine is significantly lower than in Israel, where the per capita GDP has consistently been 15 to 19 times higher over the past two decades.

58. Altogether, economic disparities between Palestine and Israel, the labour market is also a target of the Israeli regime because it is another way to intervene in the domestic economy. The outlook and evolution of economic activities in Palestine show the inevitable outcomes of occupation. The data shows realities such as social change toward wage labourers, diminishing chances in the local economy, and disqualification of potential.

59. Labour force indicators for Palestine show differentiation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, where the unemployment rate is higher in the Gaza Strip, and the average wage is lower than in the West Bank. Although unemployment decreased in the West Bank after 2008, it peaked in the Gaza Strip that same year due to the ongoing blockade. Moreover, data reveals the impact of escalating conflicts in 2002, 2006, 2008, and 2014 on labour force indicators such as decreased population in the labour force and increasing unemployment rates in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.³⁰

60. The labour force is divided into three categories based on place of work: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Israel and the settlements. The policy behind including the Palestinian labour force in Israel and the settlements is to destroy the mechanisms of the local market in Palestine. In Israel and settlements, the average wage is higher than in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The disparity in daily wages in Israel and the settlements causes unfair competition in the labour market and leaves limited choices to Palestinians. The number of Palestinians working in Israel and settlements has risen over the years.³¹

61. Due to ongoing restrictions and disparities in the labour market, many Palestinians are unable to maintain their businesses, which has increased wage employment since the occupation began. According to data from the third quarter of 2023, 70.6% of workers in the West Bank were wage employees, while 18.4% were self-employed.³² Jobs in Israel and settlements have a critical role in that. Only limited sectors are open to Palestinians in Israel and settlements, and Palestinians are employed in unskilled labour generally.

62. When we look at the distribution of the labour force by sector of occupation, current data shows differentiation between the West Bank and Israel and the settlements. According to data from the third quarter of 2023, just before October 7, 64.4% of Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements were employed in construction, and 13.5% were in mining, quarrying, and manufacturing.³³ In the West Bank, Palestinians are primarily employed in the service sector, and the public sector holds a substantial share.

63. The wage policy applied in Israel and the settlements exacerbate local economic imbalances. The wage policy implemented in Israel and the settlements aims to create imbalances in the local economy. According to third-quarter 2023 data (July-September), Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements earned an average daily wage of 297.7 ILS (1 USD = 3.75 ILS, September 2024), while the average daily wage in the West Bank was 139 ILS and 50.6 ILS in Gaza.³⁴

64. Since 2015, the average earnings of Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements have been double those of workers in the West Bank and six times higher than those in Gaza. This trend, which devalues the local Palestinian economy, can be considered part of a broader policy to transition the West Bank’s labour force into wage earners, akin to Gaza’s less dynamic economy.

65. Moreover, because of the Israeli intervention in social life and excluding the Palestinians from economic means, most of the students are subject to dropping out of school and getting into working life.

66. Economic pressures have led to increased dropout rates among boys as many enter the labour force to support their families. Additionally, restrictions imposed by the Zionist regime drain students’ motivation to pursue higher education, contributing to increased high school dropout rates. The NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) rate is exceptionally high in Gaza, with more severe restrictions. From 2012 to 2019, the NEET rate in Palestine displayed a general upward trend.

67. Another noteworthy point is the high number of students affected by attacks from the occupation forces. In the 2022-2023 school year, there were 5141 disabled students enrolled in state schools in the West Bank and 2200 in the Gaza Strip, comprising 0.5% of all students.³⁵

68. The university system in Palestine faces significant challenges because of the Israeli regime. While most of the universities are located mainly in the West Bank, there are limited choices for universities in the Gaza Strip because of the blockade.

69. Students encounter difficulties accessing universities in the West Bank because of checkpoints, and university administrators and academics face similar restrictions, which reduces their opportunities for academic development.³⁶ The occupation authorities often deny visas to academics seeking international opportunities, further limiting regional academic mobility.³⁷

70. In addition to direct and indirect limitations affecting the education system, there exist constraints within the healthcare system that hinder its proper functioning.

71. Three different entities provide healthcare services in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority is responsible for healthcare in the West Bank, while Hamas manages the Ministry of Health in Gaza. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) also offers healthcare services to registered Palestinian refugees. However, the prominent challenge for Palestinians is accessing healthcare, which is hampered by restrictions and limitations by the Israeli government.

72. Despite the responsibility of the authorities for civilian access to primary healthcare in occupied territories, the occupation regime imposes a nine-step permit process for Palestinian patients who need treatment outside their region.³⁸

73. This process, intensified by the blockade on Gaza, also applies in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Hospitals in Gaza and the West Bank lack sufficient equipment and specialists for complex cases like cancer and heart disease, leading to about 50% of cancer patients needing exit permits for treatment outside the region.³⁹ Between 2019 and 2020, 65% of permit applications from Gaza and 84% from the West Bank were approved, with men aged 18-40 being the most frequently denied.⁴⁰

74. Healthcare services differ between Palestine and Israel, which shows deepened disparities because of the Israeli regime. In 2021, Palestinian per capita healthcare expenditure reached a 22-year high of $383.90, significantly lower than the global average of $1,638.80.⁴¹ In contrast, Israel’s per capita healthcare expenditure was $4,339, which is 11 times higher than that of Palestine. The disparity in health indicators between Palestine and Israel is also growing. However, efforts by the authority to reduce households’ healthcare costs in Palestine can be partly attributed to international aid.

75. Another indicator for health services is household out-of-pocket expenditures, which have risen because of the lack of government expenditures. Between 2010 and 2017, the share of household out-of-pocket spending increased from 36% to 41.7%.⁴²

76. It is noteworthy to point out that, in the early 2000s, there was minimal difference in this indicator between Palestine and Israel; however, over time, Palestine’s expenditure pattern has come to resemble that of other low-income countries, which highlights the growing impact of poverty on the healthcare sector in Palestine.

77. Furthermore, significant data show that public health is in danger because of the attacks by the occupation forces. They prevent people from getting enough food and make access to food challenging, which leads to malnutrition and stunting among children. Between 2000 and 2019, the rate of malnutrition in children remained below 4%, although the stunting rate among children under five reached 8.7% in 2019.

F. CONCLUSION

78. Socio-economic indicators show that Israel invades all areas of Palestinian society, with mechanisms of occupying regime over Palestinian society and how it turns Palestinian society into a “control society.” Israel exerts control over all aspects of social life in Palestine, from employment to accessing education. Intervention through control mechanisms in different areas aims to empower Palestinians. Settlement policy and its apparatuses are the mechanisms that aim to challenge demographic balance, intervene in economic activities and labour markets, and create violence in social life.

79. The settlement policy fundamentally contributes to violence against Palestinians. The expansion of occupation, which extends from Palestinian land to the Palestinian economy and encompasses issues ranging from the destruction of olive trees to access to healthcare, has led to significant violations of Palestinians' rights. Beyond individual and familial displacement, Palestinians have been dispossessed collectively.

80. The settlement strategy, by all means, gave rise to settler colonial violence, intending to render Palestine increasingly uninhabitable for Palestinians. Also, the systematic violence shows that October 7 was not the beginning point; the wave of attacks initiated on October 7 can be viewed as the intensification of ongoing destruction and elevation of the assault on Palestinians to the level of genocide. This genocidal process, deeply rooted in occupation, is not new but rather an extension of long-standing violence.

G. EXPERT OBLIGATIONS

81. We confirm that we have made clear which facts and matters referred to in this report are within our own knowledge and which are not. Those that are within our knowledge we confirm to be true. The opinions we have expressed represent our true and complete professional opinions on the matters to which they refer.

82. We understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought by anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

83. We confirm that we have not received any remuneration for preparing this report.

Şüheda Nur Uzuntaş Ahmet Sait Öner

Istanbul, Türkiye Istanbul, Türkiye

22 November 2024 22 November 2024